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The Irrational Investor’s Risk Profile
I. INTRODUCTION
Webster defines the term irrational as “(1): not endowed with reason or
understanding (2): lacking usual or normal mental clarity or coherence” (Webster, 2010).
The average, normal investor is an individual who has chosen to delay current
consumption and save money for his future. An individual who saves and invests for the
future could hardly be defined as someone who lacks understanding or coherence. To the
contrary an investor understands the need to plan for the future, and the desire to have his
money work for himself in the interim, whether that is by investing in a savings account,
CD, stocks, bonds etc… It is true that many investors, and the average investor, are
irrational, but not in the way Webster defines it. Traditional finance defines a rational
investor as one who makes choices that attempt to maximize his utility, or return on
investment for a given level of risk. The rational investor is not affected by emotions,
cognitive biases, or external factors that do not directly affect his stated utility. The
irrational investor is subject to cognitive biases, and is influenced by emotions such as
fear, greed, and anxiety – which may cause the investor to be influenced by short-term
phenomena, even though his goals are long-term in nature. In other words, the irrational
investor is a normal human being - his utility contains benefits that cannot be understood
or programmed into a computer (Statman, 2011). Traditional finance theory treats
investors as if they are not affected by biases or emotions, and has developed models and
tools for the rational, emotionless investor. Unfortunately, because the average investor
is not rational, the traditional approach and corresponding tools may be a detriment to2
investors, as evidenced by the poor return on investments average investors have
historically achieved (Dalbar, 2010).
Over the past 20 years, the average investor has experienced investment returns
significantly lower than those generated by a passive, non-managed portfolio of S&P 500
stocks (Dalbar, 2010). Dalbar, Inc. reports that the annualized return of an average equity
(stock) investor for the past 20 years (ending 12/31/2009) was 3.17% compared to an
annualized return of 8.20% for the S&P 500 index. An index, such as the S&P 500, is an
unmanaged basket of securities that are selected at a point in time that have few, if any,
changes over the course of several years. It is not only stock investors that underperform
their benchmark. Those who invest in a diversified portfolio of securities (stocks and
bonds), as well as those who invest only in bonds, also underperform their respective
benchmarks. The average diversified investor had an annualized return of 2.34%, and the
average bond investor had a return of 1.02%, which were significantly lower than the
respective benchmarks, and did not even keep pace with inflation during that period
(Dalbar, 2010). This is surprising, given the great flexibility and many tools investors
have compared to a passive index of similar securities. An investor should be able to
benefit from the flexibility of excluding poor investments, and actively managing his
portfolio based upon the economic environment and future expectations.
Investors have access to many tools to help them decide which securities to invest
in and how to create a portfolio that is commensurate with their preference for risk and
return. Some of these tools include analysts’ research reports as well as access to the
opinions and forecasts of financial experts. An investor could take advantage of the3
various books and articles written on how to be a successful investor and generate
superior returns over time, and even utilize diversification instruments available through
financial institutions and found on the web. Yet despite all these tools, the average
investor’s return is significantly lower than that achieved by an index of similar
securities. An index is always invested (that is, the entire value of the portfolio is held in
non-cash assets), irrespective of an analyst’s outlook for a specific stock or general
economic outlook, and experiences the severity and duration of all stock market gains
and losses. To the contrary, an individual investor can be fully invested, partially
invested, or choose to remain un-invested based upon his future expected return and
economic forecast. While individual investors have so many tools at their disposal and
the flexibility to adjust their portfolio based upon new information, why do they
consistently perform so poorly compared to a passive index?
The analysis by Dalbar (2010) is derived from reports regarding investors moving
money in and out of many mutual funds, and the timing of such movements. This allows
Dalbar to decipher the performance of the average investor across stocks, bonds and a
diversified portfolio. Their results are not unique; a report by the investment research
company, Morningstar®, on specific mutual funds found that investors also experienced
significantly lower returns than were earned by the very mutual funds they were invested
in (Haig, 2009). In other words, Morningstar® found that because of the timing of
investors’ purchases and sales of fund shares, investors performed worse than if they had
simply held the fund through good and bad times. Dalbar found that the average hold
period for any type of investor is between 3.2 – 4.3 years, meaning investors tend not to4
“buy and hold.” There have been other studies confirming that investors jump in and out
of the market, accumulating less money on average than a buy and hold strategy
(Statman, 2011). What causes a long term investor to make short term choices that may
jeopardize his ability to achieve his long term goals?
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the various factors that affect an individual
investor’s decisions and cause chronic underperformance. Much of the research to date
has been with respect to optimization models, such as the Modern Portfolio Theory, that
recommends a portfolio of securities that have the most favorable risk/reward tradeoff
(portfolio efficiency). These optimizers are implemented after the investor’s utility (risk
preference) has been defined and input into the optimization model. The most common
manner to define the risk preference of the investor is through a risk profile
questionnaire. These questionnaires are promoted by financial institutions, both full-
service firms such as Merrill Lynch®, and self-service firms such as Fidelity®, to help the
investor define his risk profile. Financial firms will usually recommend an allocation of
securities based upon the calculated risk profile that it believes will provide the investor
with the optimal allocation of securities given the risk preference.
There have been many articles and books written to teach an individual how to
invest and ultimately improve his investment returns for a given level of risk. The
majority of the research with respect to constructing portfolios and improving investor
performance has been dedicated to portfolio selection and management after the utility
function (risk profile) is defined. This thesis takes a step back to examine whether the
tools used to find the investor’s risk profile are valid and result in accurate profiles. If the5
current risk profile questionnaire elicits an incorrect risk profile, then any optimization
model, no matter how good it is, may not produce a portfolio of securities commensurate
with the investor’s true risk profile. It is imperative that the risk profile is accurately
determined before we can move on to optimization and other investment techniques
aimed to enhance investor performance.
I will begin the thesis by reviewing published research and literature on current
portfolio tools available to investors (i.e. portfolio optimizers) with their respective
strengths and weaknesses. I will also review behavioral finance research with respect to
biases that influence investors to make decisions contrary to their expected utility, as well
as research that challenges the traditional methods of measuring an investor’s risk
tolerance. I will then lay out the framework for this study and explain what questions the
study will attempt to answer along with the outcomes I anticipate. The study will consist
of a survey to gather information, and I will explain how that data was obtained and what
methods were used to interpret the data. The results of the data will then be revealed
along with their interpretation. Finally I will conclude by summarizing what was learned
through this study and recommending ideas for implementation and future research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Various studies have been undertaken in an attempt to explain the reason(s) for
investor underperformance and provide suggestions that help investors have a more
positive investment experience. The following literature review describes some of the
more prominent studies that have influenced the investment community in the past, as6
well as more modern studies that challenge the assumptions made by traditional finance
models and introduce behavioral aspects into the theory.
Modern Portfolio Theory
In 1952, Harry Markowitz introduced a quantitative model to create an efficient
portfolio for investors (Markowitz, 1952). Markowitz defines efficiency as a portfolio
that maximizes expected return for a given level of risk, or minimizes the level of risk for
a given return. The resulting portfolio reduces the unsystematic risk of the portfolio
through diversification of various assets. His model is based upon the precepts that
investors prefer a portfolio with less volatility, and that they will maximize expected
utility, which he defines as the return of the portfolio (for a given level of risk). The
model and theory behind it later became known as the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT).
While the framework for the MPT was first published in the 1950’s, it was not well
recognized by the financial community until Markowitz was awarded the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 1990 for his work and findings. This summary will review the basic tenets
of the theory along with its strengths and weaknesses; for a more detailed analysis the
reader is referred to his article in the Journal of Finance (Markowitz, 1952) and his
subsequent book, Portfolio Selection (Markowitz, 1959).
The MPT was created for the institutional investor – one that is assumed to be
rational and not limited by a time horizon, illiquidity or investment restrictions.
Markowitz makes this assumption very clear in his papers, but the financial community
has mostly ignored his instruction, and heavily promoted the MPT to both institutional
and retail investors. It is interesting to note that Wall Street firms did not begin using the7
MPT in their marketing and portfolio models until Markowitz won a Nobel Prize for his
findings, even though they were published and available to the public since 1959.
The basic premise behind the theory is to define the investor’s utility function,
and then create a portfolio of securities that will maximize the expected return and
minimize the level of risk. Markowitz used a mean variance analyzer to consider not
only the expected risk and return of an individual security, but also how that security
interacted with others in the portfolio (covariance). Before Markowitz’ findings,
portfolios were constructed based upon the characteristics of each individual security
without respect to diversification. Mean variance analysis found that an asset that was
deemed too risky for a portfolio could actually reduce the risk of the portfolio as a whole
because of its low correlation to other assets. These findings brought about the idea of
diversification, not only among individual securities but also asset classes. A
conservative investor who may have had a portfolio of 100% bonds found that by adding
a small percentage of stocks to the portfolio, he could actually reduce his total portfolio
risk. The result for the conservative investor was a portfolio with greater expected return
and less portfolio risk…a more efficient portfolio.
Financial experts and firms preach the gospel of diversification among differing
securities and asset classes, especially those with low or no correlation to other securities.
While the MPT has brought important discoveries to the investment community, it is by
no means a complete, foolproof way to invest. Financial institutions and advisors, who
unquestioningly use the MPT, are applying a model created for institutional investors to8
the mass population of investors without recognizing the pitfalls, or properly educating
the retail investor of this misapplication.
It is quite common that economic and financial studies have both strengths and
weaknesses. It is just as important to understand the weaknesses of a study, and its
effects, as it is to embrace its strengths. The primary weakness of the MPT, besides its
misapplication to the retail investor, is its simplifying assumptions. Assumptions are an
important part in economic models so long as they hold true; in the case of the MPT
some of the assumptions have been disproved through empirical evidence, and therefore
should be scrutinized.
MPT Assumptions
1. Returns are random and normally distributed
One assumption Markowitz makes is that security returns are random and
normally distributed. Security returns may certainly be random from day to day, but
empirical evidence shows that securities tend to trend over time. The prevalence of
trends has brought about a type of investing called technical analysis, in which investors
invest based upon certain trends and patterns of security prices. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to analyze the success or failure of such methodology, but a study published in
1994 reports that investors who take market statistics into account and practice technical
analysis do better than those who do not (Blume & O’Hara, 1994). The fact that trends
exist among securities should not be surprising since stock prices tend to follow the
business cycle. The growth phase of the business cycle typically results in a company
experiencing increased revenues, cash flows and earnings. The improved financial9
condition of the company may result in an increase in dividends and/or an increase in
reported net earnings, both of which have been shown to be major factors that determine
a security’s price (Gordon, 1959). The growth may continue for some time, as that
particular phase of the business cycle runs its course. Returns from bonds and other asset
classes will trend as well with respect to their correlation to the business cycle. Figure 1
is a chart of Microsoft’s stock price for the past five years. As a result of the financial
crisis of 2008, the economy entered into a severe contraction and the stock price of
Microsoft was in a downward trend for 15 months. As leading indicators turned positive,
so did the stock price of Microsoft - it entered an upward trend that lasted for 9 months.
Contrary to the assumption that security prices are random, the evidence shows security
prices may trend for extended periods of time (Pring, 1991).
Figure 1: Price per Share of Microsoft® Stock, 2006-2010
The assumption of a normal distribution has greater consequence for the investor.
Markowitz makes this assumption because a normal distribution is required to consider
important statistical measures to be valid, such as variance, standard deviation and10
covariance. The problem is that the normal distribution quantifies the occurrence of an
isolated event as being extremely rare, and the probability of an isolated event occurring
decreases at an exponential rate. This means that many isolated, outlying events are
simply ignored under the normal distribution, because their chance of occurrence is so
remote. A study of over 800 years of economic data and 66 countries finds that these
outlying events occur more frequently than we think, and more frequently than the
normal distribution predicts (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). In the decade of 2000, we
experienced two significant stock market losses which were not predicted, and were
ultimately classified as anomalies, or outlier events. The normal distribution predicts
outlying events with much less frequency than we actually experience; therefore any
security analysis assuming that returns are normally distributed may understate the actual
risk of said security. As stated previously, the MPT was created specifically for
institutional investors, those that have access to all investments, a long term time horizon
and are “rational.” Endowment funds fit this description, and religiously follow the
theory. The largest endowment funds, which all follow the precepts of the MPT, are
those managed by Harvard, Yale and Stanford. In fiscal year 2009, which included the
crash of 2008, they each suffered substantial losses. Harvard and Stanford both lost 27%;
Yale lost 25% and the equity market, as measured by the S&P 500, was down 30%
during that period (McDonald, 2010). The extent of the loss in 2008, even for a
diversified portfolio, may be acceptable for an institution with a perpetual time horizon,
but could cause havoc and great concern for an individual investor who plans to retire in
the near future. The fact that outlying events occur more often than the theory predicts11
should be an important factor when determining the composition of the portfolio for the
investor.
There have been attempts to improve upon the assumption of the normal
distribution in an attempt to find a distribution that more accurately resembles the stock
market. Initial analyses attempted to better explain the distribution of returns by adding
statistical moments to the data, such as skewness (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1976), and
creating a lognormal distribution of returns instead of the normal distribution (Elton &
Gruber, 1974). Despite these attempts to find a better distribution for stock prices, they
were shown to be more data intensive and did not produce a more desirable portfolio than
did the mean variance optimizer (Elton & Gruber, 1997). Studies continue in the present
day trying to find the distribution that best fits the distribution of stock returns and the
predictability of said distributions (Egan, 2007; Cenesizoglu & Timmermann, 2008).
2. Security forecasts are accurate
Markowitz also makes the assumption that a security analyst can effectively
forecast the expected return and variance of an individual security as well as its
correlation with other securities. The theory recommends that a detailed analysis is done
on each individual security in the universe, and then a portfolio is developed based upon
the forecasts of the security analyst and the findings of the mean variance optimizer.
After the year is over, the portfolio is liquidated and the analysis starts over again to find
next year’s optimal portfolio. The requirement to have an accurate forecast for each
security’s expected return, volatility, and correlation is essential for the mean variance
optimizer to produce a valid output. The analyst must be able to understand the critical12
cycles shaping both the current and future economic environment. She needs to
understand what decisions a company will make, how her actions will affect earnings and
how the investing public will perceive that information. The analyst must then also
forecast the company’s covariance with that of other securities. The core of any
optimizer, including the mean variance optimizer, relies upon accurate forecasts. If
forecasts are not accurate, then the mean variance optimizer will provide an incorrect
allocation strategy. This is where the problem lies. While the assumption for accurate
forecasts is crucial to this theory, it is not realistic, and empirical evidence shows that
forecasts are generally not accurate.
There are several examples of experts’ inability to accurately forecast the future,
especially when it comes to forecasting specific values. Experts are good at forecasting
the status quo, but not a change in direction or any significant deviation from the norm.
A review of 2,000 past economic predictions found that economists didn’t predict
anything; their prediction was just an extrapolation of prior data (Bouchaud & Potters,
2003). There are several examples in recent history of significant events that were not
predicted or represented by mainstream economists or Wall Street strategists. Who
forecast “The Lost Decade” in Japan when they were near invincible during the late
1980’s? How many people forecast the “Dot Com Bust” during the technology boom of
1998-1999? When oil was trading at $11/barrel in 1998, how many forecast it would go
up to $147 within 10 years? (Dent, 2008). There may have been a few individuals who
predicted these events, but their predictions were not accepted or implemented in
mainstream economic models. Individuals and experts alike are unable to account for13
outlier events in their forecasts. A group of researchers (Lichtenstein et. al, 1982)
performed an experiment in which they asked subjects to provide estimates for future
security returns along with confidence intervals in which they were 90% certain future
returns would fall. They found that subjects gave a smaller range of distribution than
actually occurred, or in other words they failed to account for outlying events.
Behavioral finance professor, Werner De Bondt, studied the accuracy and value of
forecasts by security analysts and economists. He found that the average forecast does
not accurately predict future occurrences, and therefore is not useful when developing an
investment strategy (De Bondt, 1991).
The inability to accurately forecast is not unique to security analysts and
economists. Philip Tetlock, a professor of Organizational Behavior at the University of
California, Berkeley, analyzed over 82,000 forecasts from over 300 experts in the fields
of academics, economics and public policy. He compared those forecasts to real-world
actual outcomes. In an interview with Money Magazine he said, “My research prepared
me for widespread forecasting failures. We found that our experts’ predictions barely
beat random guesses – the statistical equivalent of a dart-throwing chimp – and proved no
better than predictions of reasonably well-read nonexperts. Ironically, the more famous
the expert, the less accurate his or her predictions tended to be” (Schurenberg, 2009, p.2).
There is a popular joke among forecasters: “Economists exist to make weather
forecasters look good.” There may be some truth to this joke. Tyszka & Zielonka (2002)
found that security analysts were worse at predicting, but had greater confidence in their
prediction than weather forecasters. The tendency of economists and security analysts to14
forecast only events within the norm begs us to ask whether expert forecasts provide any
value to investors. The MPT makes a crucial assumption of accurate forecasts, but
empirical evidence and numerous studies show that forecasts are rarely accurate. This
reality significantly weakens the final output of Markowitz’ mean variance optimizer.
Even if all other assumptions hold, the allocation recommended by the optimizer should
have the following disclosure: If the forecast provided by security analysts are incorrect,
then the recommended portfolio will be incorrect. Numerous empirical studies have
shown forecasts are seldom accurate.
3. Investors are rational
A rational individual is one that makes choices based upon sound reason and
logic, one whose decisions follow the expected utility maxim. The expected utility
maxim is a hypothesis in which an individual’s preferences are calculated and compared
in the face of uncertainty. A rational investor is expected to maximize his utility given
his preferences as defined in the utility function. Markowitz, who assumed investors are
rational, acknowledges that the rational person does not exist in reality, but that we can
still use the theory of rational behavior as a guide (Markowitz, 1959). An institution may
be more rational than an individual investor, but the problem is that the model is being
used for the individual, irrational investor. What good is an efficient, optimal portfolio
that assumes rationality for an investor who is irrational? Do investment tools that
assume investor rationality do more harm to the long term success of the investor,
because they do not account for the investor’s inherent irrationality?15
The expected utility theory has several axioms that must hold true for it to be
valid, yet studies show that the axiom of independence is commonly violated. The axiom
of independence states that a choice (preference) will hold independent of the possibility
of another outcome. Allais (1997) performed tests to see if the axiom of independence
was violated in a set of lotteries. In his experiment, participants were asked to choose
among two lotteries, each representing different potential payouts and their respective
probabilities. Then the participants were asked to choose among another set of lotteries
with differing payouts and probabilities. Allais found that the participants were not able
to evaluate the lotteries independently from each other – choices were influenced by the
outcome of another lottery. The main findings, of what is now known as the “Allais
Paradox”, were that participants made inconsistent, irrational choices. These irrational
decisions could be because the individual simply made an error in judgment, but others
believe outside factors not accounted for in the utility function – such as hope, fear and
suspense come into play (Markowitz, 1959). Recently there has been much study on the
irrationality of the individual and what causes such behavior.
Dan Ariely, a professor of Behavioral Economics at Duke University, has studied
whether irrational behavior can be predicted. Many of his findings have been published
in a single book, Predictably Irrational (Ariely, 2008). Mathematical models and
algorithms, such as the MPT, measure and forecast the absolute values of variables. In
contrast, Ariely says people forecast the relationship between the value of a variable and
a baseline value. This is because a person obtains utility, not from his current position,16
but from his position relative to something else. An example of this can be illustrated by
the following graphic:
Which blue circle is bigger?
At first glance, the blue circle on the left appears bigger, because relative to the circles
surrounding it, it is much bigger. However, the actual size of the blue circle is identical
in both pictures. This type of relative reasoning could explain why individuals violate the
axioms of expected utility - people make different choices based upon how they perceive
them, even though the absolute outcome is the same.
Ariely also looked at how well an individual could predict his own behavior at
times of great emotion (Ariely, 2008). He held a study at the University of California,
Berkeley with a group of male college students. He asked the students to answer a series
of questions regarding what sexual behaviors they may undertake on a date and which
sexual activities they deem as appropriate. The questions were asked and answers
recorded when the students were in a calm, rational state of mind. Days later, Ariely17
asked the same students if they would be willing to answer the same questions again, but
this time they were to answer the questions during a period of great emotion. He exposed
the students to pornography, and at the moment of greatest stimulation asked that they
answer the same questions again. He found that the students grossly underestimated their
behavior in an emotional state. He found they were likely to engage in more risqué
sexual activity than they had predicted, and some behaviors that were deemed by the
students as inappropriate in the calm state were judged to be appropriate in the state of
high emotion. The prediction of future behavior was wrong by a large margin, and
therefore Ariely concludes that we are unable to accurately predict how we will act in
future situations of intense emotions.
Experiments and empirical evidence have challenged the idea that humans are
fundamentally rational. Psychologists and behavioral experts believe irrationality comes
from the way our brains are wired and that there is some explanation for irrational
behavior. Some, such as Ariely, believe that our irrationality may be predictable.
Decisions that are not made in line with the neoclassical utility model may be termed
“irrational,” but that does not mean they cannot be predicted. Opaluch and Segerson
(1989) report that the literature on this topic shows several examples where “irrational”
behavior can be explained by alternative models for decision making. The MPT assumes
rationality when the evidence is clear that individuals do not follow the expected utility
maximization theory, and are therefore defined as irrational.18
Improving upon the MPT
There have been several attempts to improve upon some aspects of Markowitz’
mean variance algorithm to obtain a better portfolio for the investor. Resampled
Efficiency and the Post-Modern Portfolio Theory incorporate different statistical, data
and behavioral assumptions into the optimizer, while Prospect Theory incorporates the
irrational investor into the utility model.
1. Resampled Efficiency
Resampled Efficiency is an optimization method that attempts to improve upon
the weaknesses of both normal distributions and the need for accurate forecasts.
Resampled Efficiency was created because its author, Richard Michaud (1998), was
bothered by the exactness of inputs required by most optimization algorithms and the fact
that forecasts are imperfect. After much analysis Michaud patented an optimization
method that uses a Monte Carlo simulation instead of relying on accurate forecasts.
Monte Carlo is a sophisticated simulation method that obtains its results from repeated
random sampling. It is mostly used when an exact or accurate measurement is not
possible through traditional computing methods (Hubbard, 2007). Michaud believes the
Monte Carlo method allows for a more correct output from the optimizer in the event
stock market returns are different from what was expected (Rockel, 2010).
An article written by the Michauds (Michaud &Michaud, 2008) discusses the
results of a simulation test performed by Nilufer Usman (Markowitz & Usman, 2003)
comparing the resampled efficiency optimizer to the mean variance optimizer. The
simulation test was performed between the two methods using ten years of data, and the19
results were astounding: the resampled efficiency optimizer achieved a more efficient
portfolio than the mean variance optimizer in 30 out of 30 tests. Michaud explained this
occurred because the mean variance optimizer requires exact data and assumes perfect
information (Michaud & Michaud, 2008). A word of caution on these results - the
experiment was done on a very small data set, only 20 stocks representing only very large
companies (in terms of market capitalization). Any results from such a limited study
should be thoroughly scrutinized, as it was in an empirical analysis written just two years
after the findings of the initial experiment were made public. In a report by Kohli
(2005), the author compared the results of both the resampled efficiency and the mean
variance optimizers for 60 portfolios of 75 stocks each for a total of 4500 stocks between
2001 and 2003. The findings of the analysis were at odds with Usman’s test; resampled
efficiency offered little advantage when compared to the mean variance optimizer. It
should be pointed out that the empirical analysis only covered a period of 1 year and 5
months, while the Usman experiment lasted for 10 years. There is an obvious
discrepancy between the findings of the two experiments, and the Usman test lacks a
large sample size, while the Kohli analysis is limited in its duration. Given the
discrepancy and weaknesses in both analyses, one cannot conclusively state which
optimizer is superior to the other.
As in the tests performed above, many optimizers are compared to each other to
determine which creates a more efficient portfolio. No matter how many times a
portfolio is simulated, the actual results can only be determined in real time market
experiences – which entail investor irrationality. In the case of resampled efficiency we20
can gather information from actual returns versus market returns. The Michauds run an
investment company, New Frontier Advisors, which offers the resampled efficiency
method through a portfolio that any investor can access, and therefore provides actual
performance data. Regardless of whether the resampled efficiency optimizer or mean
variance optimizer is better, how has the resampled efficiency portfolio performed in real
life over the past few years, which included both good and bad markets? One would
expect a good optimizer to produce above average returns in good years, or at the very
least not lose as much as passive stock market indices in bad years. Listed below are
New Frontier’s conservative and aggressive portfolios compared to their respective
benchmark indices. All performance numbers are through 6/30/2010:
1 YR 3YR 5YR 3yr Std. Dev.
New Frontier Conservative 7.6% 1.0% 2.0% 7.3
80% Bond - 20% Stock Index 6.3% 5.1% 4.6% 7.3
New Frontier Aggressive 12.4% -11.3% -0.5% 24.1
S&P 500 Total Return 14.4% - 9.8% -0.8% 20.7
Source: New Frontier Advisor Marketing Materials, Genworth Wealth Management
In many cases, the portfolios had lower returns than the benchmark while having
the same, or higher risk as measured by standard deviation. While the jury may be out on
whether the resampled efficiency optimizer is superior to Markowitz’, the portfolios
generated by New Frontier’s optimizer have not consistently provided superior risk/return
results than their respective benchmarks.
2. Post-Modern Portfolio Theory
The Post-Modern Portfolio Theory (PMPT) also attempts to improve upon
Markowitz’ mean variance optimizer. The primary difference is that Markowitz defines21
risk in terms of standard deviation, and the PMPT defines risk only as downside risk.
Downside risk is defined as the risk of loss, risk of underperformance, or of not meeting
one’s goals. Frank Sortino, author of PMPT, believes standard deviation is not an
accurate measure of risk because it assumes normal distributions and is focused on the
mean return (Swisher & Kasten, 2005). Downside risk recognizes that returns are not
normally distributed and focuses on a minimum acceptable return to the investor, which
more closely captures the investor’s risk tolerance than a portfolio’s standard deviation.
Sortino believes the downside risk optimizer begins to incorporate behavioral finance
into the model, which is lacking in the mean variance optimizer and the assumption of
rationality. In an extensive analysis that used past data and ran simulations of future
market values, the downside risk optimizer resulted in a higher expected portfolio value
than did the mean variance optimizer (Swisher & Kasten, 2005). In fact, the two often
gave contradictory results, where the least risky portfolio as defined by the mean variance
optimizer was actually the most risky portfolio as defined by the downside risk optimizer.
As witnessed with resampled efficiency, just because one optimizer provides better
returns in a simulated environment does not mean it performs well in real life situations,
especially when the market experiences an outlier event. Sortino employs the downside
risk optimizer through the asset management firm, Sortino Financial Advisors®. The
portfolios Sortino manages were incepted at different times, and lack long term
performance, but there exists performance figures for the years 2007 and 2008. 2008 is
of special interest because that was the year of the financial crisis “anomaly.” The
figures for the Sortino portfolio:22
Portfolio 2007 2008
Sortino Aggressive 7.6% -29%
S&P 500 Total Return 5.5% -37%
Source: Sortino Investment Advisors
While it is clear the downside risk optimizer outperformed the market for those two
years, it is also clear that they were not immune from outlier events. In a letter to his
investors in 2008, Sortino explained that the financial crisis was different from prior
crises, and that a new strategy may be needed going forward (Sortino, 2008).
3. Prospect Theory
Prospect theory, developed by behavioral finance experts, challenges the notion of
investor rationality and specifically the expected utility theory. As stated earlier, various
studies have shown that investors do not make decisions according to the expected utility
maxim, and for that they are labeled “irrational.” Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
developed a utility theory called prospect theory that recognizes that axioms of expected
utility theory are violated, and attempts to account for behavioral biases in the model.
Prospect theory incorporates the findings of several studies on human behavior, namely
that people do not analyze outcomes correctly, suffer from loss aversion and regret
aversion, and engage in mental accounting. People tend to underweight outcomes that
have a small probability of occurrence compared to outcomes that have a more certain
outcome. An investor exhibits loss aversion when he is risk-averse when facing gains
and is risk taking when facing losses. He may, therefore, end up taking more risk than he
is comfortable with (Schmidt & Traub, 2002). Regret aversion encourages investors to
hold on to assets that have lost value to avoid the pain from having made a poor
investment decision, leading to a riskier portfolio and lower returns (Odean, 1998).23
Mental accounting is the way investors perceive their investment outcomes, how they
track their investments and how often they evaluate their portfolios.
There are two phases to prospect theory - the editing phase and the evaluation
phase. In the editing phase the brain attempts to simplify new information. The six steps
to editing are:
1) Coding – Recognize whether an outcome is a gain or a loss
2) Combination – Combine probabilities with identical outcomes
3) Segregation – Segregate riskless from risky prospects
4) Cancellation – Cancel variables where probabilities and outcomes are same in
both prospects
5) Simplify – Round up or down
6) Exclude Dominated Items – Throw out choices strictly dominated by another
Once the brain has simplified the choices as much as it can, it moves on to the
evaluation phase. In the evaluation phase, the individual gives a certain weighting to
each decision, calculates the problem (decision tree), and chooses the decision with the
highest expected outcome. The weight given to each decision is what ultimately
determines the utility function and decision made. Prospect theory is not a solution in
itself; rather it is a way to more accurately decipher an individual’s utility curve by
relaxing the tenets that underlie rationality (Barberis & Thaler, 2003).
Behavioral Finance
Behavioral finance is the study of psychological effects on the individual
pertaining to choices made with respect to money and investing. It recognizes that the
decisions individuals make are influenced by one or more behavioral biases. This is
contrary to traditional finance, where the individual is assumed to be rational and follow24
the expected utility theory as previously described. While the precepts of behavioral
finance have been around for several years, there has been very slow progress to adapt its
findings in the financial markets.
Behavioral biases are generally classified as being of either a cognitive or
emotional type. Some believe that a proper understanding of these biases and knowing
the biases a person exhibits can allow these “irrationalities” to be predicted and modeled
(Ariely 2008). A summary of some of the most prominent biases are below.
1. Cognitive Biases
Availability: An individual makes decisions based upon the information that is available
and her awareness of it. An investor who does not dedicate the necessary time to
understand all aspects of the information (both good and bad) may make an incorrect
decision based upon limited information.
Representativeness: An individual makes decisions based upon history and stereotypes.
An investor may try to replicate past performance by investing in stocks that gained value
in the recent past and avoiding stocks that recently lost value. Studies have shown the
opposite is true. A portfolio containing the best performing 35 stocks in the prior three
year period had returns less than the average return for New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) index over the subsequent three year period. A portfolio containing the worst
performing 35 stocks in the prior three year period had returns significantly greater than
the NYSE return over the subsequent three year period (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985).
Confirmation Bias: An individual who decides upon a course of action or makes a
decision will look for evidence to support her decision while either discounting or25
ignoring evidence to the contrary. This bias may influence another type of bias,
anchoring.
Anchoring/Conservatism: People who exhibit this bias are slow to adapt new
information into future forecasts and expectations. This bias results in individuals
weighting prior beliefs and knowledge more heavily than new information. For instance,
an investor may choose to not invest in a company which experienced a positive earnings
surprise, because she believes the results were a single period anomaly, even though
studies show that companies with strong earnings outperform over time (Bernard &
Seyhun, 1997). Conservatism also affects economists and analysts, as evidenced by their
forecasts being a culmination of past forecasts and market results. In other words, their
future predictions are many times anchored to past results (Bouchaud & Potters, 2003).
Anchoring and conservatism may be influenced by the Status Quo Bias, which is an
individual’s preference for the current state rather than change (Kahneman et. al., 1991).
Overconfidence: Overconfidence is a bias that may affect experts and professionals more
often than a novice investor. An overconfident investor may invest a greater portion of
her portfolio in a single security or sector that she feels strongly about. Overconfidence
results in the investor not recognizing the possibility of being in error, and the risk of that
error. Overconfidence may therefore result in a riskier portfolio than anticipated.
Illusion of Money: This bias refers to investors making decisions based upon nominal
terms and not real terms. This could lead an investor to believe that income securities,
such as certificates of deposit and bonds, will allow her to meet her living needs without
accounting for inflation. For instance, a bond that is yielding 5% may be quite attractive26
in nominal terms, but if inflation is also at 5%, the real return would be 0%. This
cognitive error could cause the investor to overestimate the future purchasing power of
her investments.
House Money Effect: This bias refers to gains realized in an account and treating those
gains as free or “house money.” The investor would reinvest those gains into an even
riskier security/strategy, which would increase the risk of the portfolio, perhaps to a level
that is beyond the investor’s desired risk tolerance.
Mental Accounting: This bias refers to how an investor classifies gains and losses and
treats accounts differently based upon objectives. This may result in the investor creating
a sub-optimal total portfolio, if she does not account for the correlations among securities
in the various accounts.
Myopia: This bias is commonly combined with that of loss aversion, because they often
occur together. The bias of myopia may result in the investor checking her performance
often, and could encourage her to make investment decisions based upon short term
portfolio performance.
2. Emotional Biases
Loss Aversion: This bias recognizes that the pain of loss is greater than the joy from gain
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and is at the heart of prospect theory. Loss aversion leads
investors to take greater risk when facing losses, while locking in profits quickly when
faced with gains to avoid potential future loss from that security. The effects of loss
aversion cause investors to experience poor investment returns (Pompian, 2006). Studies
confirm that investors regularly experience loss aversion (Kahneman et. al., 1991)27
Pride/Fear of Regret: An investor exhibits this bias when her choices are driven by the
joy and instant gratification from selling a security that has a gain, and the desire to not
experience the pain from selling a security that has a loss. Pride and regret cause similar
results as loss aversion, but for different reasons. Like loss aversion, pride and regret
cause investors to sell winners quickly to experience the pride of having made a
profitable investment and hold onto losers so not to experience the regret of having made
a poor investment decision. Studies show that individuals who are quick to sell winners
and slow to sell losers tend to have below average portfolio returns (Odean, 1998).
Optimism: An optimistic investor is one who believes that whatever decisions she makes
will turn out to be good ones. An optimist may choose to ignore bad news or negative
information that she believes is just a pessimistic outlook. The optimist may also be
subject to the bias of overconfidence. Optimism may cause an investor to fail to realize
the potential downside of her holdings, and therefore underestimate the risk of loss.
Aversion to Ambiguity: This bias is very similar to the Status Quo bias. People who
have this bias prefer the familiar to the unfamiliar, even if the familiar is not a favorable
outcome. A classic example of this bias occurred recently with the bailout of AIG and
other financial institutions as well as with Long Term Capital Management in 1980. In
the case of Long Term Capital Management, it was decided that a bailout was necessary
because it was believed that not bailing them out would result in a greater economic
harm. (Shefrin, 2000).
Endowment Effect: This bias is an emotional attachment to that which is owned. An
investor places higher value on what she owns than the market does. This leads to an28
investor not getting a “fair” price and holding onto an asset that may not be a good fit for
her risk profile (Plott & Zeiler, 2005).
Snake Bite Effect: This bias is exhibited by an investor who has a negative experience,
and reverts to a strategy that no longer reflects her needs and goals. An investor who
makes poor decisions and has a bad investment experience may become more averse to
risk or loss - reducing the probability that she reaches her initial goals.
An individual may experience one or more of these behavioral biases. Imagine
the following scenario: Stephanie is very confident in her ability to make a good
decision, but doesn’t have the time to properly research her investments. One afternoon
she watches a well respected analyst on TV, who just touted how the last two forecasts
were spot on, and predicts that some security is undervalued and a good buy. The analyst
rattles off a few pieces of financial and economic data and says he believes the stock can
go up 40% from here. Stephanie recognizes the company and routinely buys goods from
them; in addition she agrees with the financial talking points the analyst gave. Stephanie
decides to invest a large part of her portfolio in this security because the prospects of
return are so good. In this scenario, which is not unrealistic, Stephanie commits the
following biases: availability (from only listening to one analyst), representativeness
(from following the analyst’s advice because of prior success), overconfidence, anchoring
(to the 40% return), optimism (from believing things will turn out well), and aversion to
ambiguity (because the investor knows the company).
A behavioral trait not directly listed as a bias by behavioral finance experts, but
equally important in the decision making process, is how individuals act in the face of29
uncertainty. Investors not only react to the current state of information, but they make
decisions based upon what they perceive the future to be. Anticipatory feelings such as
hope, fear, anxiety and suspense play a major role in the decisions we make. A study on
the impact of anticipatory feelings found that conventional measures of risk
underestimate the effect of uncertainty on asset prices (Caplin & Leahy, 1997). This
could cause an investor to make a decision contrary to the expected utility theory, not
because of the current situation or any predictable bias, but due to the anxiety she feels
about what may happen in the future.
One potential solution to overcoming behavioral biases may be to educate
individuals about their biases – make them aware of the biases, so they can work on
improving their decision making process. That seems like an easy solution, but does
educating about behavioral biases translate into individuals making non-biased decisions?
A recent study was undertaken to determine whether knowledge about an individual’s
behavioral biases could allow her to overcome them when in the decision making state
(Menkhoff & Nikiforow, 2009). The study focused only on portfolio managers, because
they have a very strong financial incentive to overcome their biases and produce superior
returns for their investors. The study found that behavioral biases exist in the financial
industry, and while the portfolio managers were able to reduce their biases through
learning, they were not able to overcome them entirely. The authors further conclude that
we may be able recognize biases in others, but we have a difficult time recognizing, and
therefore correcting, our own biases.30
Behavioral biases are believed to be a contributing factor as to why the average
investor underperforms a passive buy and hold strategy. Traditional finance theory and
models do not account for behavioral biases, and therefore may provide incorrect
guidance, and may result in the investor making poor investment decisions. Studies show
that investors regularly jump in and out of stocks and bonds and accumulate less money
on average than investors who buy and hold portfolios (Statman, 2011). The average
stock only and bond only investors remain invested for 3.2 years at a time; the average
diversified investor remains invested for only 4.3 years at a time (Dalbar, 2010). Investor
behavior is a contrary indicator to the stock market, as investors tend to act at the wrong
time, allowing their emotions and behavioral biases to overrule rational decisions. A
study by the Gallup poll in 1999 (after a huge run up in stock prices) found that a clear
majority believed it was a good time to invest in stocks. The same poll was replicated in
2002 (after two years of major stock market losses) with 66% of respondents stating it
was not a good time to invest (Gallup, 2002). The traditional utility theory and linear
optimization models cannot account for this behavior – whether it be rational or
irrational, the evidence is clear that the behavior exists. Instead of ignoring the reality of
this behavior and suggest that the human is simply in error, behavioral finance attempts
to explain the underlying causes of the behavior in an attempt to predict and model the
behavior.
Prospect theory replaces the assumption of rationality in utility theory with
allowances for irrational behavior. Prospect theory and behavioral finance go hand in
hand to develop a more appropriate model for the average individual that exhibits31
behavioral biases. Of all the theories that challenge the accuracy of expected utility,
prospect theory may be the best tool for financial applications (Barberis & Thaler, 2003).
Risk Profile Questionnaires
The purpose of the present research is to take a step back from the portfolio
optimizers and understand who the investor is, so that the proper investment model can
be applied. The primary tool to get to know the investor and their preferences is the risk
profile questionnaire. Self-service firms such as Fidelity®, Vanguard® and Schwab®
make these questionnaires available for investors, so they can classify their preference for
risk (from conservative to aggressive) and suggest a portfolio of securities commensurate
with that risk profile. Full service firms such as Morgan Stanley®, Merrill Lynch® and
independent financial advisors often require these questionnaires when the investor
engages in a fee-based relationship with an advisor. While traditional risk questionnaires
are widely accepted and used by financial firms, there is much debate over their validity.
Several years ago, John Grable and Ruth Lytton (1999) challenged the simplicity
and validity of traditional risk profile questionnaires, and created a multidimensional
financial risk assessment that included questions with respect to various measures of risk
and prospect theory. Their questionnaire was based upon the recommendations from
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) - that a risk assessment should include several
distinct financial scenarios and situations. Grable and Lytton constructed a
multidimensional, 13-item financial risk questionnaire with the intent of eliciting a more
accurate and comprehensive risk profile than the one question risk assessment offered by
the Survey of Consumer Finance. Their questionnaire was initially tested in a pilot study32
consisting of university staff to evaluate its validity and effectiveness. Regression and
factor analysis confirmed that the risk assessment instrument was both a valid and
effective instrument in describing the investor’s risk profile. A few years later, a
different study by Grable and Lytton (2003), using an online survey with a different
sample, again confirmed the validity of the 13-item financial risk tolerance questionnaire.
The underlying purpose of their research was to create a more accurate risk tolerance
questionnaire, and they offered the 13-item instrument as a starting point. Their
recommendation was for researchers and financial practitioners to test the questionnaire
in various scenarios and differing samples to improve upon the questionnaire, and
ultimately create a valid, reliable, and standardized risk tolerance questionnaire that
would be used by the financial community.
In the eleven years since Grable and Lytton (1999) published their 13-item risk
assessment instrument, there has been little progress to update the manner in which
investors are profiled. Financial firms continue to use the same traditional methods for
measuring the risk profile of an individual, despite evidence that more valid ways to
profile investors exist. In this thesis, I build upon the research that has been done to date
by performing an experiment that analyzes a firm’s specific risk profile questionnaire,
and incorporates questions to determine whether participants exhibit a particular
behavioral bias.
1 While the traditional questionnaires employed by financial firms are a
start to identifying and understanding the investor, the assumption of rationality that is
built into the traditional risk questionnaires may yield incorrect results.
1 Grable & Lytton did not test their questionnaire against a multi-question risk profile of a specific
brokerage firm, nor did their questionnaire attempt to uncover specific behavioral biases.33
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The question posed at the beginning of this thesis was why the securities chosen
by the average investor greatly underperform a similar basket of securities over time.
Possible explanations could be that the investor paid commissions or advisory fees that
bring down his return, but the difference is much more than that – something else is
affecting the average investor’s ability to perform as well as a passive index of securities.
Current investment tools assume the individual is rational while evidence shows
individuals act irrationally in certain situations. The risk profile questionnaire, which is
the primary tool used to get to know the investor, also assumes the investor is rational
and will follow the expected utility theory irrespective of the investment environment.
The notion of “this is how an investor should act” permeates the financial industry
without regard to how the investor may actually behave. SmartMoney® Magazine
recently published the “Perfect Portfolio” for the 25 year old bachelor that recommended
putting 94% of the portfolio in stocks and stated, “With decades before you retire, don’t
sweat the markets’ short-term ups and downs” (Prior & Tarquinio, 2011, 43). The
industry projects how an investor should act rather than attempts to understand
underlying biases the investor has, and how the biases may affect the investor’s decisions
among various situations. What good is a portfolio comprised mainly of stocks, if the
investor cannot tolerate the risk and ends up selling when losses begin to accrue in his
account, regardless of his age?
For this study, I constructed a survey with three primary goals. The first part of
the survey is a traditional risk profile questionnaire that is representative of what34
investors currently take online or through their brokerage firm. The purpose of the risk
profile questionnaire is to calculate an individual’s risk profile – specifically whether the
participant is classified as “Growth” or “Not Growth.” A “Growth” investor is one who
desires his portfolio to grow significantly over time and is willing to accept short term
losses and volatility in portfolio value to achieve it. A “Not Growth” investor is one who
is willing to earn lower portfolio returns over time in order to have less volatility and
minimal short term losses. The second section of the survey includes questions
commonly used by researchers to assess whether a subject exhibits one or more
behavioral biases – specifically myopia, loss aversion, anchoring and overconfidence.
The third part of the survey is a simulation. It includes questions that ask what the
participant would do in various stock market and economic scenarios. The scenarios are
structured so that the subject’s choices provide evidence of behavioral biases. The survey
also includes a list of questions about demographic characteristics that could influence a
subject’s risk tolerance, tendency to exhibit behavioral biases, and investment behavior.
These characteristics include age, gender, education, investment experience, the use of a
financial advisor, income, and net worth. Finally, the survey includes questions about the
respondents’ perceptions of the survey, such as whether they believed the information
would be kept confidential and how well they understood the survey.
The survey results should allow us to answer the following questions:
 Do participants in the survey exhibit one or more behavioral biases?
 Does the calculated risk profile (from the questionnaire) confirm or contradict
any behavioral biases considered in this experiment?35
 What investment decisions are expected for individuals with a particular
behavioral bias?
 Are there any correlations between the behavioral finance questions and how the
respondent answered the simulation questions?
 Are there any correlations between behavioral biases and the participant’s risk
tolerance (as measured by the risk questionnaire) or demographics?
The Model
The data collected from the survey will be analyzed using multiple regression
models. In the survey, seven questions are scored and summed collectively (based upon
the risk questionnaire scoring key) to characterize the participant as either “Growth” or
“Not Growth.” In addition, fifteen questions elicit evidence for the presence of
behavioral biases. Each of the sixteen responses constitutes a characteristic of the
participant and will be a dependent variable. There will be a total of 16 regression
equations, one for each dependent variable with demographic information acting as the
independent variables and modeled as follows:
Y1 = β0 + β1(Gender) + β2(Experience) + β3(Advisor) + β4(Education) + β5(Age35) +  β6(Age45) + β7(Age55) +
          β8(NetWorth250) + β9(NetWorth500) + β10(NetWorth1000) +β11(NetWorth1000p) +  ε 
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
Y16 = β0 + β1(Gender) + β2(Experience) + β3(Advisor) + β4(Education) + β5(Age35) +  β6(Age45) + β7(Age55) +
           β8(NetWorth250) + β9(NetWorth500) + β10(NetWorth1000) +β11(NetWorth1000p) +  ε 
Table 1 provides a description for each dependent variable along with its respective
variable ID.36
Table 1. Description of Dependent Variables
Variable Description
Y1 GR Risk tolerance of investor (Growth/Not)
Y2 QLA1 Behavior question #1 on Loss Aversion
Y3 QLA2 Behavior question #2 on Loss Aversion
Y4 QLA3 Behavior question #3 on Loss Aversion
Y5 QAN Behavior question on Anchoring
Y6 QOC Behavior question on Overconfidence
Y7 QMY Behavior question on Myopia
Y8 SMY Simulation question on Myopia
Y9 SOC1 Simulation question #1 on Overconfidence
Y10 SOC2 Simulation question #2 on Overconfidence
Y11 SOC3 Simulation question #3 on Overconfidence
Y12 SAN1 Simulation question #1 on Anchoring
Y13 SAN2 Simulation question #2 on Anchoring
Y14 SAN3 Simulation question #3 on Anchoring
Y15 SLA1 Simulation question #1 on Loss Aversion
Y16 SLA2 Simulation question #2 on Loss Aversion
Each dependent variable will take on a value of either 0 or 1. The respondent
will receive a “1” if his risk profile is classified as “Growth,” or if he exhibits a specific
behavioral bias, and a “0” otherwise. The independent variables of gender, experience,
advisor and education also take on binomial values. The respondent receives a “1” if
male, is an experienced investor (more than 5 years investment experience), works with a
financial advisor, or has a college degree (or greater). Age and net worth are tiered in
order to interpret any marginal effects, or in other words how an increase/decrease in age
or net worth affects the dependent variable. Income will also be collected as a
demographic variable, but was not included in the model as explained in the results
section. A participant will be classified as exhibiting a behavioral bias if, in the survey,37
he chooses any response that signals a specific behavioral bias. Some participants may
exhibit more than one, or perhaps all of the biases considered.
The risk profile questionnaire has only one objective, to classify the investor’s
risk tolerance on a scale from conservative to aggressive, although in this study the
participant will be classified either as “Growth” or “Not Growth.” The only behavioral
bias that is expected to have a strong correlation with the risk profile is that of loss
aversion. Among participants classified as “Growth,” I would expect to see a small
percentage of, if any, respondents exhibiting loss aversion. This is because loss averse
investors are more concerned about losing money than they are about making money,
while growth investors are more concerned with making money over the long term. On
the other hand, among respondents classified as “Not Growth,” I would expect to see a
significant percentage of respondents exhibiting loss aversion. In addition, I would
expect age to have a strong positive correlation to loss aversion because as an investor
nears retirement, he tends to be more concerned about preserving capital than growing it
aggressively. One purpose of this thesis is to determine the interactions of all the
variables, and whether there is any explanatory power from the demographic information.
Expected effects of behavioral biases
The loss averse investor is expected to remain in a rational state and abide by the
investment plan (allocation) during periods of low stock market volatility. In a period of
stock market gains the loss averse investor will harvest his gains quickly, thus limiting
upside potential. In a period of stock market and account losses, the loss averse investor
may continue to hold the securities, but at some point will likely shift to a more
conservative portfolio (or completely cash out of the stock market) for an extended38
period of time. The practice of limiting the pain of potential future account losses by
selling stocks after the market goes down may bring temporary psychological relief to the
investor, but it would be a detriment in the long run if he fails to participate in any stock
market recovery. Any period where the stock market recovers from a prior loss will
likely leave the loss averse investor worse off.
The myopic investor is not expected to be affected by a stock market period with
low volatility and will continue to monitor the performance of his portfolio on an
occasional basis. In periods of either strong stock market gains or losses (greater
volatility), the myopic investor is likely to increase his frequency of viewing the account
and, when coupled with another bias, may be influenced by recent account performance
to make short-term decisions to the detriment of his initial long term goals. Empirical
evidence shows that investors obtain higher returns over time by staying with a long term
allocation compared to those who micromanage their accounts (Dalbar, 2010).
The investor who is overconfident is not expected to be affected by a stock market
period of low volatility and would keep his initial portfolio intact. However, if a period
of low volatility corresponds with gains in the stock market, it could increase his
confidence as he experiences positive returns and attributes such performance to his
investment ability. In a period of economic expansion, the overconfident investor will
increase his risk by becoming more concentrated in only the stocks or funds that grow the
most. During a period of economic expansion and stock market gains, the overconfident
investor will shift to a portfolio that entails more risk than he is comfortable with as he
looks for greater returns, and the success of selecting “winning” stocks would further fuel39
the investor’s overconfidence. In a period of stock market losses, the overconfident
investor will hold losing investments and may even add to the losing positions, because
he believes the stock price is lower due to the ignorance of other investors, rather than
accept the fact that he made a bad investment decision. The overall result for the
overconfident investor is greater exposure to risk than elicited in the investor profile,
more volatility and greater swings in account value than originally expected.
The investor who has an anchoring bias is not expected to be affected by a stock
market period of low volatility and would remain with his original investment plan. In a
period of economic expansion and stock market gains, the anchoring investor will do
quite well, but if the expansion lasts long enough, the investor may opt for a riskier
portfolio as he anchors his future economic outlook and expected account performance to
the recent gains and economic prosperity. In a period of stock market losses, the
anchoring investor will hold his portfolio without making changes in the very short term
as he anchors to the recent gains and expects stocks to continue increasing in value.
However, as was the case with stock market gains, if stock market losses continue long
enough the investor may eventually adjust his economic outlook and expected returns to
be negative and shift his portfolio accordingly. Investors that have an anchoring bias are
likely to chase past performance with a lag - encouraging a buy high and sell low
investment strategy.
It is expected that the behavioral finance questions in the survey will have some
predictive power to how the respondents answer in the simulation (“what if”) portion of
the survey. For example, if a participant chooses a response that corresponds with loss40
aversion in the questionnaire, it is expected he will also show loss aversion behaviors in
the simulation portion of the survey.
The biases examined in this survey are just a sampling of the many behavioral
biases that humans experience. No matter which bias an investor exhibits, biases may
influence the choices the investor makes, especially when confronted with uncertainty or
periods of emotion, such as greed and fear. It is expected that during periods of stable
economic growth and low stock market volatility that the investor will not be influenced
by behavioral biases, but in periods that elicit strong emotion or uncertainty the biases
will surface and persuade investors to make decisions contrary to their long term
investment plan.
IV. DATA AND METHODS
The data for this experiment was obtained using an online survey via
SurveyMonkey™. Participants for the survey were solicited via electronic
communication and notified that this research was being done by the Applied Economics
Department at the University of Minnesota. There were three primary avenues for
finding participants: I sent out emails with the survey link through my own network of
contacts, a financial planning group sent out emails to their clients with the survey link
attached, and a well-read blog posted the survey link online. Participants did not receive
any benefit for completing the survey - most were doing so because they either wanted to
support the research, or support the individual asking them to complete the survey. I
collected responses from January 3, 2011 through January 27, 2011.41
The Sample
The primary purpose of using an online survey and distributing the link through
multiple channels was to obtain a sample that was representative of the investor
population. A total of 292 individual surveys were completed. Only one survey was
accepted from each IP address and since there was not any financial incentive to take the
survey, it is believed that 292 surveys were completed from 292 distinct individuals. I
compared the characteristics from the sample with the general population of investors, as
reported by the data tables furnished in the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF), to determine how well the sample represented the investor population
(Federal Reserve Board, 2007). The 2007 SCF consisted of 4,422 interviews collected,
which the Federal Reserve believes represents 116 million families. The ages of
respondents from my study were similar to the ages of those in the general investor
population. Both my survey and Table #1 (01-07) of the 2007 SCF reported 59% of
respondents over the age of 45, though the SCF reported 38% of the respondents were
over the age of 55, while my survey had only 25% of respondents over the age of 55.
The same SCF table reported that 35% of the investor population had a four year college
degree (or higher), while 71% of survey respondents had at least a four year college
degree. I was unable to find a breakdown of gender information by the SCF, but the
2008 Census reports 51% of the general population was female (Census, 2008),
compared to 66% of the respondents in the survey. Net worth was not an easy
characteristic to compare because the SCF provided an average net worth dollar figure,
while the survey reported ranges of net worth. The average net worth as reported in
Table #4 of the 2007 SCF was $557,000. The survey reported 67% of respondents with42
net worth less than $500,000, and 33% greater than $500,000. Income was also difficult
to distinguish because of comparing a mean value with a range of values. Table #1 (01-
07) in the 2007 SCF reported average income of $84,100, while 52% of survey
respondents reported income less than $75,000 and 48% reported income greater than
$75,000. Survey respondents were predominately Caucasian (95%), while the SCF
reported 71% of their respondents as White/Not Hispanic. As a group, the survey
respondents were about the same age, more educated, and more predominantly female
and white than the general investor population. A complete summary of the
characteristics of the respondents in the sample, along with some basic findings, can be
found in table 2 on the following page.
The Survey
All data collected from the survey were from the internet; no one received a paper
copy to fill out. One of the challenges with an online survey is that the participant cannot
ask for clarification on any question or response choice. In developing the survey
questions it was important that they were short enough for people to read, and concise
enough for them to understand without needing additional clarification. Some
behavioral finance questions considered for inclusion in the survey could not be used
because pilot tests of the survey resulted in feedback that some of the questions or
response choices were not clear. I was very careful to construct the survey in a way in
which anyone could understand the survey and complete it in a reasonable amount of43
Table 2. Subject Characteristics with Basic Findings
(292 total subjects)












Male 97 34% 46% 97% 95% 99% 80%
Female 188 66% 71% 96% 95% 98% 73%
Age: Under 25 7 2% 57% 71% 100% 100% 71%
25 - 35 73 25% 85% 98% 97% 99% 79%
36 - 45 68 23% 90% 95% 93% 99% 70%
46 - 55 70 34% 64% 97% 91% 100% 77%
56 - 65 48 16% 21% 98% 98% 96% 79%
66 - 75 24 8% 0% 100% 100% 96% 71%
Over 75 2 1% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Investment Yrs: None 9 3% 89% 78% 100% 100% 78%
Less than 2 yrs 24 8% 79% 96% 100% 96% 62%
2 - 5 years 22 8% 64% 95% 95% 100% 91%
6 - 10 years 49 17% 78% 98% 92% 100% 73%
More than 10 years 185 64% 55% 98% 95% 98% 76%
Use Advisor 194 68% 52% 98% 94% 98% 75%
Do Not Use Advisor 93 32% 83% 95% 96% 98% 77%
Education: HS/Some
College 69 24% 46% 96% 96% 97% 74%
Vocational Degree 15 5% 33% 96% 100% 93% 40%
College Degree 89 31% 66% 100% 94% 100% 74%
Some Graduate School 19 6% 68% 99% 100% 99% 77%
Graduate Degree 98 34% 25% 100% 94% 99% 84%
Net Worth: Less than
$100k 70 25% 73% 97% 94% 99% 73%
$100k - $250k 67 24% 78% 94% 94% 100% 76%
$250k - $500k 52 18% 50% 96% 100% 96% 65%
$500k - $1MM 55 19% 49% 100% 95% 100% 87%
Over $ 1 Million 38 13% 50% 97% 95% 95% 82%
Income: Less than $25k 20 8% 50% 100% 100% 100% 70%
$25k - $75k 113 44% 54% 96% 96% 99% 78%
$75k - 150k 75 29% 67% 99% 92% 99% 76%
$150k - $250k 36 14% 72% 97% 92% 100% 75%
Over $250k 12 5% 75% 92% 100% 92% 100%
Race: Caucasian 271 95%
Not Caucasian 15 5%
* If N does not total to 292, that is because the subject did not answer that question44
time. 92% of the participants said that they understood the survey completely or
understood most of the survey, and the average time to complete the survey was less than
ten minutes. The survey consisted of 33 questions and was structured in four main
sections:
A) Traditional risk profile questionnaire (questions 2 - 8 of the survey)
B) Questions pertaining to behavioral biases (questions 9 -15 of the survey)
C) Simulation questions (questions 16 – 24 of the survey)
D) Demographic information (questions 27 – 33 of the survey)
The survey questions remained in the same order for each participant, but the response
choices for questions in part B and part C were randomized for each participant to
minimize any framing bias. A copy of the survey can be found in Appendix 1.
Part A of the survey, the traditional risk profile questionnaire, was obtained from
Woodbury Financial Services, and is representative of a questionnaire used today by
many financial institutions to derive the investor’s risk tolerance. Each response in the
risk profile questionnaire is given a score and when summed could range anywhere
between 7 and 35 points. The total score is then translated into one of five risk categories
ranging from conservative to aggressive. However, for this experiment the risk profile
categories were reduced from five categories to two: either the investor was classified as
“Growth” or “Non-Growth” with any score equal to or above 22 being classified as
“Growth.” The classification of the investor risk tolerance was important to allow
comparisons between the traditional methods of interpreting risk with modern methods
that include behavioral biases.45
Part B of the survey consisted of questions that attempt to find out if the
participant exhibits the biases of loss aversion, myopia, overconfidence and/or anchoring.
Questions were patterned after behavioral finance questions used in prior research to
determine whether the participant exhibits a specific behavioral bias, and the questions
were adapted for the constraints of the online survey (questions had to be brief and
concise). In this section there was one question for myopia, one for overconfidence, one
for anchoring and four questions for loss aversion. The several questions for loss
aversion were necessary because that bias can show up in various circumstances and
were intended to represent all instances in which loss aversion might be present.
Part C of the survey consisted of the simulation section of the survey. The
questions were structured to simulate what has occurred or may occur in the economy or
stock market. Some of the questions were meant to elicit feelings of greed or fear, just as
one may encounter in an actual investment scheme. In this part of the survey, three
questions were asked to see if the participant exhibited overconfidence, three for
anchoring, two for loss aversion and one that tested for myopia. The multiple questions
for each bias (except myopia) were given to see if the participant would show a bias in
differing scenarios.
Upon developing the survey, there was some contemplation about the questions in
section B and section C, since they are both testing for the same biases and all are
hypothetical scenarios. There were two main reasons for choosing to administer the
survey in the manner it was. First, part B had to do with basic behavioral finance
questions without regard to economic or stock market changes, while part C had to do46
with simulations. Second, I wanted to test whether the questions in part B had a strong
correlation (predictive power) with the responses provided in the simulation (part C).
Part D of the survey asked various demographic questions to determine if there
were any interesting findings or correlations within the data. Most of the demographic
variables also served as the independent variables for the regression analysis. In addition
to the demographic variables, participants were asked how confident they were that the
information obtained in the survey would only be used for this experiment and would be
kept confidential. It is believed that the more confident the participants were in the
purpose and confidentiality of the survey, the more likely they would be to furnish honest
answers. 96% of participants said they were somewhat or very confident that their results
would be kept confidential.
The questions in the traditional risk profile were used primarily to identify
whether the participant was growth (1) or not growth (0); the individual questions in the
risk profile questionnaire are not part of the regression analysis, but will be analyzed
separately. The dependent variables for the regression analysis were comprised of the
respondent’s risk profile (Part A) and all the questions from Part B and Part C of the
survey. Since all of the dependent variables were binomial, it was determined that the
regressions would be run using the probit model.
Regression Methods
The complete results from the probit regressions are found in Appendix 2.
Regression estimates, using the individual probit model in SAS, are found in the first
three data columns of Appendix 2. Few of the coefficients were statistically significant
so I ran the same equations using a multivariate probit analysis (MVprobit) in STATA™47
to see if I could obtain more statistically significant results. The results of the MVprobit
regression can be found in the last three data columns of Appendix 2. Besides providing
coefficient estimates for the variables, the MVprobit also constructed a correlation matrix
for further interpretation.
The correlation matrix obtained by the MVprobit attempts to capture unobserved
preferences or other distinctions that influence the responses of the participants. Factor
analysis is used to interpret the correlation matrix and searches for patterns of
relationships among the dependent variables and accounts for independent variables, both
those observed in the survey and those that were not measured directly. Factor analysis is
more ambiguous than regression equations because it requires subjectivity in interpreting
the covariance matrix and the subsequent factor titles. However, given the many
insignificant coefficients in the regression results, it was felt that factor analysis would
provide additional insight not obtained by the regression itself. Factor analysis has been
used in past economic reports where coefficient estimates were not statistically
significant and/or a more detailed analysis of the data was desired (Hurley & Mitchell,
2009, Grable & Lytton, 1999).
V. RESULTS
The results obtained by the online survey will be reported in three distinct
sections: the first will have to do with an analysis of the responses from the traditional
risk profile questionnaire section (questions 2 – 8 of the survey), then I will report and
discuss the results from the regression analysis – both individual probit results and those48
obtained using the MVprobit method, and finally I will compare the results obtained from
the standard regressions with that of factor analysis.
Results from Traditional Risk Profile
As stated previously, the traditional risk profile questionnaire used for this survey
had a total of seven questions asking about the participants’ age and income needs, their
overall investment objective, and their expectations of investment results in both good
and bad markets. Each response receives a score, and the scores are then summed to
classify subjects as either a growth investor or not a growth investor. It is common
practice that once the risk profile is generated that a portfolio allocation is recommended
for that risk profile. There is little, if any, attention given to the responses of individual
questions, rather the risk profile is based upon the cumulative score of all the responses.
Profiling based upon a total score rather than individual responses leads me to wonder
whether there can be responses selected within the risk profile that are contrary to the
classified risk profile of the participant. An analysis of the responses within the risk
profile questionnaire confirms that contradictory statements can be made, not only among
the stated risk profile and specific questions, but among the questions themselves.
The following observations obtained from the survey were of special interest:
1) 24% of Growth respondents said they would have a hard time tolerating any losses over next three
years. An additional 39% of Growth respondents said they could only tolerate a small loss over the
next three years.
2) 29% of Growth respondents said they could at most tolerate a loss of 10% in a three month period
3) 68% of respondents who said they expect to mostly track the stock market in a rising market also
said they could only tolerate a small loss over the next three years49
4) 55% of respondents who said they expect to mostly track the stock market in a rising market also
said they couldn’t tolerate losses greater than 10% in a three month period
5) 65% of the respondents less than 45 years old said their goal was to grow the portfolio
significantly or aggressively
6) 88% of respondents who stated their ultimate goal for their portfolio was to grow significantly or
aggressively were classified as a growth investor
A risk profile of “Growth” will typically result in a recommended portfolio of 70% - 95%
in stocks, and the remainder in cash or bonds, depending upon the actual score of the risk
profile and the brokerage firm recommending it. Because of the significant allocation to
stocks, it is expected that a growth portfolio will be volatile and its performance will, for
the most part, track the performance of the stock market.
The first two observations listed above were of respondents who were classified
as growth investors, and yet responded in the survey that they would not be able to
tolerate the downside risk and volatility that is inherent in a growth oriented portfolio,
even over the short term. One only has to do a cursory review of the stock market to see
multiple examples of when the stock market has gone down more than 10% in a three
month period, or has experienced losses over a three-year period. An investor who is
classified as growth, and yet does not have the capability to handle losses, may be
surprised when significant losses occur, and may be influenced to sell her stock
investments in order to limit future losses and/or sleep well at night.
The third and fourth observation had to do with what the respondent would expect
from her investment during normal market conditions (positive market returns) and then
what she would expect in a down market. I find it interesting that over half of the50
respondents expect to experience most of the gains of the stock market in an up market,
but only experience a portion of losses when the stock market performs poorly. Barring
the ability to accurately predict when a good market or when a bad market will occur,
these goals are contrary to each other. An investor should not expect to capture most of
the upside of the stock market unless she is also willing to capture most of the downside
of the market. Perhaps this is an issue with the overall risk profile questionnaire; the fact
that the investor can make both selections in the questionnaire may act as reinforcement
that she can expect gains in good times and limited losses in bad times. The contrary
responses may tell us something about the investor – she may take too much risk when
times are good, and too little risk when times are bad, or in other words she may anchor
her future expectations to what has recently happened and adjust her portfolio
accordingly.
The fifth observation compares the age of the respondent to her stated investment
goal (question #4 in the survey). While 65% of young investors (less than age 45) had a
stated goal of growth, this also means that 35% of young investors said they either
wanted to grow the portfolio moderately or with caution. This is interesting because the
financial community regularly says that young investors should be able to tolerate risk
and therefore be more aggressive (Prior & Tarquinio, 2011), but in this survey,
approximately one-third of young respondents said they did not want aggressive growth.
One of the questions in the traditional risk profile questionnaire uses the investor’s age as
a score for their risk tolerance, as if age was an accurate predictor of a person’s ability to
tolerate risk. In this survey, 35% of respondents who should want growth (according to51
rational expectations) are actually more conservative. In addition, 65% of respondents
under the age of 45 said they could only tolerate a small loss over the next three years,
which is a response more indicative of a loss averse investor, than one who can tolerate
the volatility of a growth portfolio. Among survey respondents, an individual’s age has
little to do with her ability to tolerate risk and loss.
The last observation listed was one that would be expected. 88% of the
respondents who said their ultimate goal was either to grow their investments
significantly or aggressively were classified as “Growth.” Given the high correlation
between this one question and the calculated risk profile, it may be possible to do without
the other six questions for scoring purposes, and replace those questions with others that
will tell us more about the investor and her likely behavior. None of the questions in the
traditional risk profile questionnaire indicate how the investor may act in a real
investment scheme - one that contains both significant gains and significant losses. In
fact, as shown above, many of the responses within the traditional risk profile are
contradictory, and thus create confusion about who the investor really is, and what type
of portfolio would actually be best for her.
Results from Regression Analysis
As stated above, regression equations were run individually using the probit
model in SAS™, and run jointly using the multivariate probit command in STATA™.
Statistically significant variables as well as the sign and magnitude of their coefficients
were very similar between the probit and MVprobit analysis. While the results are very
similar, the MVprobit method is deemed superior because of its ability to jointly estimate
the equations, and account for correlation among the variables – and therefore will be52
used for interpreting the results. The complete regression results of both the probit and
MVprobit are found in Appendix 2, however a summary of the statistically significant
variables and the direction of their coefficients are reported in Table 3.
Table 3. Summary of Statistically Significant Variables using MVprobit
Indep. Dependent Variables
Variable GR QLA2 QAN QOC QMY SMY SOC1 SOC2 SOC3 SAN1 SAN2 SAN3 SLA1 SLA2
Male - + + -
InvExp + -
Advisor + - -
Col4 + + - + + +
Age35 - - - -
Age45 - + -





The first and third questions on loss aversion are absent from the table because
none of the independent variables were statistically significant for those questions. A
total 292 surveys were completed. 15 surveys were excluded because they were
incomplete, leaving 277 responses used for the regression analysis. A joint hypothesis
test was performed on the independent variables to see if any could be excluded from the
analysis, and it was found that all variables were jointly statistically significant at 10%.
In the regression analysis, a significance level of 10% was also used to determine
whether the individual variable was statistically significant.
Demographic information obtained from the survey that is believed to explain the
various dependent variables were gender, age, investor experience, whether the
participant uses a financial advisor, level of education, net worth and income. It was53
anticipated that all of these independent variables would be used in the regression
analysis, but income had to be omitted because I was unable to get the MVprobit model
in STATA™ to converge when including the income variable. Several attempts were
made to work around the issue, but I was unable to get the process to run. I found that
income and net worth were highly correlated variables, and given the difficulty of
obtaining regression results with the income variable, it was decided to drop the income
from the regression analysis.
The independent variables (as well as the dependent variables) are binary; they
either take on a value of 0 or 1. The variables for age and net worth are tiered to show
the additional effect an increase in age and/or net worth has on the response (dependent
variable). The coefficients are to be interpreted in an ordinal fashion, as they cannot be
easily translated into probability measures. The MVprobit does not calculate the
marginal effects of the variables, and while it would be possible to calculate marginal
effects with the individual probit regressions, it would be necessary to define the
characteristics of the average investor. Marginal effects measure the instantaneous rate
of change between the dependent variable and a change in one of the independent
variables, keeping all others fixed. This is a common procedure that is easy to calculate
for continuous variables, but not for discrete variables that take on a value of either 0 or
1. In this situation, attempting to define the characteristics of the average investor would
be subjective, and if not defined correctly, may lead to erroneous conclusions.
The regression results (coefficient, error and significance) for each dependent
variable are reported in Appendix 2. The first column lists the independent variables, the54
next three columns list the data obtained from the individual probit regression, and the
last three columns list the data obtained from the MVprobit regression. Items in bold
represent the independent variables that had a significant effect upon the dependent
variable in the regression model.
The variable for gender (Male) was given a “1” if the participant was male, and a
“0” if the participant was female. The behavioral finance question used to determine
whether the participant was overconfident (QOC) found that females tended to show
more overconfidence than males, due to the negative coefficient for males. However in
two simulation questions for overconfidence (SOC2, SOC3), the coefficient for males
was positive – meaning they acted more overconfident, believing that they would
generate better returns than both their peers and a random portfolio of securities. There
was a difference between the three overconfidence questions; the one in which females
were more overconfident, (QOC - negative coefficient) had to do with how they
perceived another person (the average investor) would perform, while the questions in
which the males were more overconfident (SOC2, SOC3 - positive coefficient) had to do
with how the participant himself would perform. The results show that with respect to
overconfidence, women in the study were too confident in other people’s ability, while
males were too confident in their own ability. Gender was also statistically significant
with one of the simulation questions on anchoring (SAN1). The negative coefficient
signifies that women in the survey tended to anchor future investment performance to the
average historical performance of the markets.55
For investor experience (Invexp), the participant was recognized as experienced
and given a “1” if they had invested for six years or more. If they had invested for less
than six years, they were given a “0.” Investor experience was statistically significant for
one of the simulation questions on overconfidence (SOC3), and one of the simulation
questions on loss aversion (SLA1). The positive coefficient investors experience in the
SOC3 equation, suggests that experienced investors expect to perform better than a
portfolio of randomly selected securities, but when compared to the portfolio of others,
the result was not significant. This could mean that a more experienced investor believes
she can beat a stock market index, and therefore it would be expected that she would
engage in activities that attempt to beat an index, such as selecting individual securities
(rather than an index fund), and perhaps trying to invest based upon perceived market
tops and bottoms. The coefficient for experience was negative in the equation for a
simulation question on loss aversion (SLA1). The question asked participants what they
would do if the stock market, and their investment portfolio, had experienced a
significant loss. Experienced investors were inclined to either hold the portfolio, or add
to their stock positions. This would be expected, since experienced investors have likely
seen both good and bad stock markets, and are aware of the volatility they could
encounter. Whether these investors were ever loss averse, it appears that time and
experience in the market may “toughen the skin,” and make them less likely to react to
the bias of loss aversion when experiencing short-term losses. It may also be worth
noting that investor experience in the probit regression had a positive coefficient for
classifying an investor as “growth,” but was insignificant for the MVprobit regression.56
The variable for advisor (Advisor) asked the participant whether they use a
financial advisor for any/all of their investment portfolio. If the participant uses an
advisor in any fashion she is given a “1.” A participant who invests entirely on her own
gets a “0.” Whether the participant uses an advisor was significant for a question on loss
aversion (QLA2), a question on overconfidence (QOC), and a simulation question on
myopia (SMY). A positive coefficient for advisor in the QLA2 equation shows that a
participant who employs a financial advisor was more likely to exhibit loss aversion
when asked whether she would play a game of chance in which there was a possibility of
incurring a loss, even though the expected value of the game was positive. This would be
expected because people may use an advisor, and their expertise, to help them manage
their risk and avoid significant losses. The variable for advisor had a negative
coefficient, and therefore a negative impact, on whether the individual was overconfident
(QOC). Another way to say this would be that investors who do not use an advisor tend
to be overconfident. This would be expected because if an individual is very confident in
her abilities, then she would not need to pay for professional help. Advisor also had a
negative coefficient (effect) on the simulation question for myopia (SMY). When asked
whether the participant would look at their account value after reading negative news on
the economy and stock market, those individuals who had an advisor were less likely to
look at their account statements, while those investors who did not have an advisor were
more likely to “check-in” and see how they were doing. This outcome may be the result
of trust in the financial advisor and in the investment plan, or the knowledge that a trusted
advisor is watching over it and will contact the investor if necessary. It would be57
expected that an investor who has a professional watch over her portfolio, especially
when accompanied with an investment plan tailored to her needs, would be less likely to
care about the short-term performance of her account.
The variable for education (Col4) describes whether a participant has a 4 year
college degree. If a participant had a 4 year college degree (or more) they were given a
“1,” if they did not have a college degree (even if they went to vocational school) they
were given a “0.” Education was a significant variable for a question on myopia (QMY),
and simulation questions on myopia (SMY), overconfidence (SOC1, SOC2), anchoring
(SAN3) and loss aversion (SLA1). Both in the question for myopia and the simulation
for myopia(QMY, SMY), a college degree (or greater) had a positive coefficient (effect)
on whether the participant was myopic. It is unclear why a college degree would have a
positive effect on myopia; perhaps the many years of tests and grades encountered in
college conditions the participant to need regular feedback on how she is performing. A
college degree had opposite effects (negative coefficient) on two overconfidence
questions (SOC1, SOC2). A degree had a negative effect on whether the participant
would increase her exposure to a certain sector of stocks, even if she believed the sector
was likely to experience significant gains, yet had a positive effect on the participant
believing her portfolio results would be superior to others. The opposite effects on two
overconfidence questions may seem contradictory on the surface, but it appears that
someone with a college degree may remain more disciplined to a diversified strategy, and
therefore is confident that she can perform better than other investors. It is interesting to
note that while those with a college degree believe they will perform better than other58
investors, they do not necessarily believe they could beat a random portfolio of securities.
This implies that those with a college education may not perform better than a stock
index, but they will not make the same investment mistakes others will make, and
therefore expect to perform better than other investors. Those with a college degree also
showed that they take more time to change their opinion when faced with new
information (SAN3). In the face of an earnings surprise and future expected gains, a
college degree had a positive coefficient to anchoring to old information and beliefs. It is
quite possible that eventually the new information would be digested and the perceived
valuation updated, but it may take longer for this to occur for those with a college degree
than those without. A college degree also had a positive effect on one of the loss
aversion questions (SLA1), specifically what the participant would do in the face of
short-term market losses. This type of behavior, coupled with myopia, has the potential
to influence an investor to stray from their long term asset allocation plan and make
decisions based upon short term events - decisions which are typically to the detriment of
the overall portfolio (Dalbar, 2010).
The variable for age (Age35, Age45, Age55) is tiered to show the additional
effect of each age group upon the dependent variable. The base group (those under the
age of 35) is not tested directly; it is captured in the intercept. Respondents who were
above age 35 were given a “1,” those who were above age 45 received another “1” and
those above age 55 received an additional “1.” The coefficient for each age group
measures the effect on that age group compared to the one below it. For instance, in the
age group of 45-55 (Age45) the coefficient shown is the effect of that age group over59
ages 35-45 (Age35). To find the total effect of the age group of Age45 on the dependent
variable, one would need to add its coefficient to the coefficient of Age35. Age was
statistically significant for the dependent variables of growth (GR), anchoring (QAN),
myopia (SMY), overconfidence (SOC2, SOC3) and loss aversion (SLA2). As one would
expect with growth, the older the participant was, the less likely she was to be classified
as a growth investor. Those between the ages of 45-55 had an effect of -0.89 on growth
and those over age 55 had an additional effect of -1.42 on growth. Younger participants
had a negative coefficient (effect) on anchoring (QAN), while older participants showed
a greater likelihood to anchor. This means that older individuals are more likely to
anchor future expectations to prior beliefs and perceptions. Perhaps this is evidence that
we become more stubborn and averse to change as we grow older. Age also had
interesting effects on myopia (SMY). Individuals under the age of 45 were less likely to
view their account statement regularly, especially in the face of negative economic news.
However those between the ages of 46-55 were much more likely to be myopic while
those above age 55 showed no additional effect either way. This may have to do with
young people having greater risk tolerance and a longer time horizon, while those near
retirement are more concerned about the potential to lose money and delay their
retirement. It was surprising to see those above age 55 not showing additional myopia in
the face of stock market losses, but that could be due to a more conservative portfolio at
that age, and therefore not as affected by stock market movements. Age did not have any
effect on overconfidence on young investors, but had a negative effect on those between
the ages of 46-55 and a positive effect on those over age 55 (SOC2). The question for60
overconfidence asked participants how their portfolio would perform compared to other
investors. These results suggest that as we age we are uncertain about our investment
abilities compared to others, but over the age of 55 we become confident that we are not
only better than others, but also better than a stock index (SOC3). While confident in
their ability compared to others, those over age 55 had a negative effect on whether they
would have a portfolio concentrated in a specific security or sector, even if they believed
that security/sector was going to increase in value. This suggests that while those over
age 55 may be overconfident, they value risk management more than trying to make
quick money. Age also had a significant effect on loss aversion (SLA2), specifically
whether the investor was quick to harvest gains and let losses ride. Younger investors, as
we would expect, had a negative coefficient with respect to loss aversion while older
investors, specifically those over age 55 had a positive coefficient to loss aversion,
showing a greater likelihood to choose a winning investment to sell than a losing
investment. This type of loss aversion is commonly tied in with the biases of regret and
pride. An older individual, who may be more over confident and stubborn than a
younger one, may have a hard time admitting she made a bad investment decision, as
evidenced by selling a losing investment. Instead such an investor would prefer to sell a
security that has gone up in value to confirm that she made a good investment decision.
The variable for net worth (Nw250, Nw500, Nw1000, Nw1000p) is tiered
similarly to age. Participants who had a net worth of less than $100,000 were in the base
group, which was captured by the intercept. Participants were given a “1” for Nw250 if
they had a net worth over $100,000. Participants were also given a “1” for Nw500 if61
their net worth exceeded $250,000, a “1” for Nw1000 if their net worth exceeded
$500,000 and a “1” for Nw1000p if their net worth exceeded $1 million. As with the
variables for age, each net worth category represented the additional effect from each net
worth group, and a summation of coefficients was necessary to find the total effect of a
specific net worth. The coefficient on net worth was statistically significant with myopia
(QMY), loss aversion (QLA2), overconfidence (SOC2) and anchoring (SAN2). Those
Having a net worth between $500,000 - $1,000,000 had a positive effect on viewing the
portfolio balance often (QMY). The effect at this one net worth level may be because it
is a significant level of wealth, but not enough to ensure complete financial freedom.
Having a net worth between $100,000 - $250,000 had a negative effect on loss aversion
with respect to playing a game of chance where the expected payoff was a positive value
(QLA2), suggesting a tendency to play the game and potentially lose money. Having a
net worth between $250,000 - $500,000 was not significant, but the value of the
coefficient was positive – indicating that having a net worth in that range correlates with
a preference to not play the game and avoid the possibility of loss. Having a net worth
between $500,000 - $1 million also had a positive effect on willingness to play the game.
The coefficient on net worth its positive value may indicate a preference to not play the
game. It is interesting to notice the effects of net worth among the game of chance, but it
is uncertain what may explain the differences in the willingness to play the game (loss
aversion) among the various levels of net worth. When participants were asked how the
performance of their portfolio would compare to other investors (SOC2), both Nw500
and Nw1000p had very significant and positive coefficients, suggesting they were quite62
confident in their ability to perform better than others. Nw250 and Nw1000 were
insignificant with small coefficients. Overall the results suggest that the wealthier an
individual is, as measured by net worth, the more likely she will believe that she is a
better investor than others(SOC2). It was also found that net worth had an effect on
anchoring (SAN2). Nw250 had a negative coefficient in the regression for anchoring,
when subjects were asked about the perceived value of a stock given past prices and
current information. The other levels of net worth did not have significant effects and
were generally flat or negative. This suggests that individuals with a net worth of
$100,000 or more were more likely to consider new information in determining the fair
value of a security, and any increases in wealth did not have much of an effect using new
information to value securities.
The regression analysis provides interesting information about what type of
participants were likely to exhibit a certain behavior or bias. There are many variables
that are not significant that lead me to wonder what type of unexplained characteristics
are in the error term and not reported in the results. In order to dig a little deeper to see if
there are any unobserved factors systematically influencing participant choices, I
analyzed the covariance matrix using factor analysis.
Factor Analysis
The primary purpose of factor analysis is to identify factors that measure and
explain similar data. It is used to study relationships among dependent variables with the
goal of finding out which independent variables may explain the dependent variable,
whether directly measured or not. There are two types of factor analysis, exploratory and63
confirmatory. An exploratory factor analysis is used when the outcome or variables are
unknown beforehand, while a confirmatory factor analysis is used to test specific
hypotheses about the structure or variables in the data. Since the survey attempts to
understand certain behavioral biases (myopia, loss aversion, overconfidence and
anchoring), this will be a confirmatory factor analysis as I am trying to confirm what
variables influence investor behavior. The number of factors to analyze is subjective,
however there are a few criteria commonly used to determine the correct number of
factors for a given set of data. One common method is to select only the factors where
the eigenvalue is greater than 1.0 (Kaiser Criterion). Another method which also uses
the eigenvalue is the screeplot. The screeplot sketches each factor’s eigenvalue in a line
plot, and it is recommended to select the factors where line segments have slopes
materially different from zero, before the line flattens out (Cattell, 1966). Since this is a
confirmatory factor analysis considering four behavioral biases, it was determined that a
selection of four factors would be more accurate than relying upon the Kaiser or screeplot
method.
Before interpreting the results of the factor analysis, a varimax rotation was used
to maximize the variance among the factor weights making the interpretation of the data
more clear. The rotated factor analysis from data obtained in the survey is in Table 4 on
the following page. The factor analysis has the names of each factor at the top, along
with a column for uniqueness. Uniqueness is the variance that is unique to the variable
and not shared with the other variables. A high uniqueness number translates into that
variable having a small relevance in the factor analysis.64
Table 4: Rotated factor loadings and unique variances
Loss Myopic Loss
Variable Aversion Aversion Overconfidence Optimism Uniqueness
GR -0.3787** - 0.3729** -0.3388** 0.4033** 0.4401
QLA1 0.2787* 0.2373 -0.0398 0.0816 0.8578
QLA2 0.3978** 0.4718** -0.1123 0.0047 0.6065
QLA3 0.6364** 0.0381 0.1813 -0.1056 0.5495
QMY -0.1366 0.6656** -0.0124 -0.1077 0.5265
QAN -0.0088 0.2790* 0.1569 0.1295 0.8807
QOC 0.2446 - 0.2504* 0.3174** 0.0787 0.7705
SMY 0.0107 0.4091** 0.0714 0.2405 0.7696
SOC1 0.1298 - 0.0514 0.3098** 0.5168** 0.6175
SOC2 -0.6993** 0.1076 0.3634** -0.0655 0.3630
SOC3 -0.1096 - 0.0110 0.8089** 0.0832 0.3266
SAN1 0.0784 -0.1288 0.0984 0.4785** 0.7386
SAN2 -0.0913 -0.1697 0.1988 -0.0112 0.9232
SAN3 0.1571 -0.0437 -0.0637 -0.5365** 0.6815
SLA1 0.2261 0.2034 -0.0503 0.2157 0.8584
SLA2 0.0075 0.2606* 0.0006 -0.0605 0.9284
* Factor loading greater than 0.25 **Factor loading greater than 0.30
The key to the factor analysis is the factor loadings - the weights and correlations
between each variable and factor. Similar to the coefficient in regression analysis, a
greater factor load indicates a stronger correlation between the factor and the dependent
variable.
The factor analysis reveals the presence of three behavioral biases considered in
this thesis (loss aversion, overconfidence, myopia), along with another behavioral bias
not directly tested, but quite influential to the participant’s responses (optimism). The
first factor, loss aversion, explains what kind of choices a loss averse investor is likely to
make in an investment environment. My results suggests that loss averse investors are
likely to be non-growth investors (negative factor loading for GR), and do not believe
that their investments will perform better than the average investor’s portfolio (SOC2). It
is uncertain whether expectation of subpar performance is due to the past investment65
performance of the investor, or because she recognizes that her portfolio is less risky than
the average investor’s portfolio – and therefore expects a lower return than the average.
A loss averse investor also prefers situations in which she has little chance of loss, even if
she also has little chance of gain (QLA2, QLA3). The prospect of realizing losses is so
painful for a loss averse investor that she would prefer to sell a security with a gain
quickly (in fear it could go down), and hold onto a losing security in hopes that it goes up
so she does not have to realize the loss (QLA1). I find it interesting that the traits for loss
aversion were evident in the behavioral finance questions (QLA1, QLA2, QLA3), but not
in the simulation questions (SLA1, SLA2). I had expected the behavioral finance
questions to be able to predict the behavior in the simulation (i.e. correlation between the
two), but that is not the case for loss aversion. In retrospect this should not be too
surprising. In the simulation, participants are asked what they would do if there was a lot
of bad economic news and the stock market dropped significantly. The responses were
given when the participant was in a calm, rational state. Unless the participant is aware
of how she has historically reacted in times of financial fear, she may not be able to
accurately predict what she would do in an actual situation of fear and uncertainty. A
study performed by Ariely (2008) found that individuals in a rational state significantly
underestimate how they will react in a future emotional situation. In that case, the
simulation questions may not be useful for a behavioral bias such as loss aversion, which
may be dormant during times of low volatility, but manifest itself in the circumstances of
uncertainty and fear.66
The second factor is myopic loss aversion. This is similar to the first factor with
the bias of loss aversion, but is coupled with the bias of myopia. Many articles in
behavioral finance combine these two biases because they often present themselves
together (Thaler, et. al, 1997). In addition to the loss aversion traits above, these
individuals require constant feedback with respect to the performance of their accounts,
and are likely to view their account balances and security holdings often (QMY).
Myopic loss averse investors are also inclined to not be overconfident (negative factor
loading for QOC). This type of investor has a very short time frame and is likely to make
investment decisions based upon short term market movements in order to appease her
emotions, even if the ultimate goal is years away (SMY). Individuals who have myopic
loss aversion tend to take less risk, and therefore earn a lower return over time than those
who do not have this bias.
The third factor is that of overconfidence. Overconfident investors had an
inclination to have a calculated risk profile of “Non-Growth,” (negative factor loading for
GR) which is surprising. I would expect overconfidence to explain an investor who has a
more aggressive risk profile. Investors who are overconfident will likely make decisions
that have more risk than they may be comfortable with (SOC1). In the survey,
overconfident investors were willing to overweight a single sector of securities if they
expected a positive outcome – an activity that seems more reasonable for aggressive
growth investors, but not for non-growth investors. Overconfident investors also believe
that they are better investors than both their peers and a stock market index (SOC2,
SOC3). An arrogant attitude could also cause the investor to take more risk than she is67
comfortable with as stock price movements contrary to her positions may be viewed as
other investors making a mistake, while the overconfident investor is correct in her view.
The inclination for an overconfident investor to be classified as “non-growth”, yet make
decisions commensurate with an aggressive risk profile may cause the portfolio to be
riskier than originally intended. An additional finding by factor analysis is that the
behavioral finance question on overconfidence (QOC) had a great deal of predictability
how the participant behaved in the simulation (SOC1, SOC2, SOC3).
The final factor is that of optimism, perhaps over-optimism. Optimism is a
behavioral bias, yet was not tested in this study. This is an example of how factor
analysis can be a useful complement to regression analysis. The survey did not directly
test how optimistic a participant was, but an analysis of the covariance matrix shows how
influential optimism was in explaining decisions a participant made. An optimistic
investor believes that the market will increase in value (SAN1), and will tend to have a
growth risk tolerance (GR). Optimism also leads to an investor’s willingness to have a
concentrated portfolio, believing that things will turn out in her favor (SOC1). An
optimistic investor also believes good earnings and strong revenue for a company will
translate into higher stock prices (negative factor load for SAN3). While it helps to be
optimistic in the future, it is more important to be realistic when investing. An optimist
may find herself taking on greater risk in good times (concentrated portfolio), and may
underestimate the true risks of individual securities and/or the market as a whole.
The factor analysis was a useful tool to determine what variables and factors
influence investor decisions. The analysis showed that there were strong predictive68
powers between behavioral finance questions with respect to myopia and overconfidence,
but did not provide feedback with respect to anchoring. The analysis also illustrated the
difficulty of creating a realistic simulation where feelings of fear and uncertainty are
triggered, and not just assumed. Had real emotions of fear and uncertainty been
triggered, there would have likely been a strong correlation between the responses given
pertaining to loss aversion in the behavioral finance questions, and choices made during
the simulation (Kahneman et. al., 1991).
The overall results of the study using both regression models and factor analysis
confirm that participants in this study exhibited behavioral biases in both the behavioral
finance questions and the simulation questions. It also found that the risk profile,
calculated by the traditional method, sometimes contradicts the actual risk tolerance of
the individual, and therefore is not a good predictor of what decisions the investor may
make in the future, especially during uncertain times. It was shown that behavioral
finance questions can be good predictors of choices individuals will make in future
investment scenarios, especially with overconfidence and myopia. The analysis also
showed very interesting interactions between an individual’s investment experience, level
of education, age and net worth and various behavioral biases. The inclusion of
behavioral finance questions can help an advisor or brokerage firm learn more about the
investor and their true risk preferences than the traditional risk profile questionnaire,
which assumes the investor is rational and follows the expected utility maxim.69
VI. CONCLUSION
The experiment conducted for this thesis provides evidence that investors have
certain behavioral biases, and these biases may influence decisions they make with
respect to their investments. As illustrated in the literature review, there are several
studies and evidence that behavioral biases are found among the general population, and
influence decisions that are deemed irrational by traditional finance theory. Despite the
evidence of behavioral biases, the financial community continues to rely upon the
traditional risk profile questionnaire, which was designed for rational individuals (such as
institutional investors). The disconnect between behavior that is assumed and behavior
that is observed poses a problem for investors and advisors who rely upon investment
tools to construct a portfolio of securities. As demonstrated in the experiment, the
traditional risk profile questionnaire not only fails to describe any biases present in the
investor, in many cases it profiles an investor as “growth” when the investor is influenced
by loss aversion. The inability of the current risk profile questionnaire to properly profile
an investor’s true risk tolerance is a contributing factor to why the average investor
significantly underperforms their respective benchmark (Dalbar, 2010).
Implementing Results
Behavioral biases have been studied for some time, and there have been several
attempts to incorporate behavioral biases into the portfolio optimization problem as was
described in the literature review. To my knowledge, this has been the first attempt to
study the effects of behavioral biases on the calculated risk profile of the investor. This is
an important first step because even if the optimization program were perfected, it would
still yield erroneous results if the stated risk profile was incorrect. It is recommended that70
the financial community acknowledge the extent that behavioral biases influence
investors, and update their risk profile questionnaires to recognize the reality of this
irrational behavior. There are several ways the risk profile questionnaire could be
updated: i) keep the risk profile questionnaire as it is and compliment it with a short
questionnaire reflecting the most common biases among investors ii) shorten the risk
profile questionnaire (in my experiment one question had a 88% correlation to the
ultimate risk profile) and include a few questions on behavioral biases iii) keep the risk
profile questionnaires the same but furnish educational materials about behavioral biases,
and their influence on future decisions. It is unlikely the financial community will make
any drastic changes in the short term. It is more likely firms would complement the
current risk profile questionnaire with an optional investor profile that includes
behavioral bias questions, and educates investors about their effects. There would be a
cost to updating the risk profile questionnaire with behavioral questions, but it would
result in a competitive advantage. Brokerage firms, especially self-service firms, are a
commodity business. Self-service firms often promote free trades for new customers and
inexpensive/free trades for clients with certain account values. Differentiation in a
commodity business is a competitive advantage, but the question is who will be the first
to make the move. As with any change, there is risk; but as with investments there is
little reward without taking some risk.
Incorporating behavioral biases into the investor profile may be easier through a
full service firm with a financial advisor because of the human element. A financial
advisor could choose to educate herself with respect to behavioral biases, and offer an71
expanded profile in addition to the firm-required traditional risk profile questionnaire.
Investors who are willing to pay a fee to an advisor would likely prefer their advisor to
provide advice based upon their actual risk preference rather than the profile dictated by a
standard questionnaire that assumes the investor is an emotionless being who will always
follow the expected utility maxim. It would be in the advisors best interest to spend extra
time with each client to ensure the recommendations properly match the clients’ true risk
profile to promote a positive and lasting relationship. This would also be a competitive
advantage for financial advisors. If a client is paying 1.00% advisory fees each year,
would they not prefer to pay that money to an advisor who brings more to the table rather
than less? There could be many advisors within the industry that would like to account
for behavioral biases, but are unsure how to do it properly, or may be restricted from
using any methods/forms not approved by the advisor’s compliance department. It is
important that full service financial firms, and their compliance departments, implement
methods of risk assessments that include the ability for the advisor to accurately profile
the complete risk tolerance of the client (including behavioral biases). At the time of this
thesis, despite the plentiful research and evidence of behavioral biases, the majority of
financial firms continue to rely upon risk questionnaires that have proven to elicit invalid,
inaccurate profiles of their clients.
Improving the Experiment
While the experiment resulted in valuable information for the purpose of this
research, it was far from perfect. There were two primary shortfalls of the experiment
that, if improved upon, could lead to more robust results: conduct the survey with a
proctor, and successfully instill emotions of fear and greed during the survey.72
Conducting the survey online without any interaction between the participants and a
proctor resulted in having to omit preferred behavioral bias questions because they were
not clear to participants in pilot tests. It may be feasible in the future to improve upon
this by creating an online survey that is more interactive so clarifications may be sought
by participants, and therefore a larger variety of behavioral finance questions could be
asked. It was apparent in the survey how hard it is for individuals (being in a rational
state) to predict how they will act in a future situation of heightened emotion. The intent
of the simulation was to draw out emotions of both fear and greed so people would
answer questions as they really would when faced with that scenario, but the results
demonstrate this was not successful. An improvement in the future would be to create an
environment in which these emotions are felt by the participants in the survey - perhaps a
stock market game with an initial endowment and the ability to either win more or lose
the endowment depending upon how well they play the game. There may be other areas
of improvement that I am not privy to at this time, and I welcome attempts to create
better techniques to study behavioral biases with respect to the investor.
Future Research
Future research could attempt to improve upon any perceived shortcomings of my
survey, or build upon these findings by comparing it to future studies. The survey I
conducted was during the month of January 2011. The world had recently experienced a
financial crisis (2007-2009) in which stock markets dropped by 50%, and subsequent
rally in the stock market, in which almost all losses had been reversed. The current
environment is one in which investors witnessed a year of one of the most powerful gains
in the history of the stock market. It would be of great interest to see how investors73
would have responded to these same questions in January 2009, after a year of significant
stock market losses. Future research could administer this same survey in a like fashion
during a period of stock market losses, and compare the results to that of this survey to
illustrate how risk tolerance and biases change as the economic environment changes.
Another potential research could examine additional behavioral biases. As noted in the
literature review, there are several behavioral biases that are common among the
investment population. The focused nature of a thesis made it impossible to test for every
behavioral bias. Another research topic would be to compare a behavioral finance
questionnaire to past investment decisions made by a pool of investors. It would be
interesting to team up with a brokerage firm (if privacy rules allow) to conduct a study on
trading behavior during periods of positive stock market gains, and periods of stock
market losses. To some extent this has already been done (Dalbar, 2010), but a more
focused study on how biases influenced past investor decisions would be of great value.
I am hopeful that this research will be accepted by the financial community and,
despite its weaknesses, be improved upon and ultimately applied to the individual
investor. As a financial advisor for over a decade and Certified Financial Planner™
Practitioner, I have seen first-hand how behavioral biases can influence investors to
abandon their long term plans to appease their short-term desires (whether the influence
be greed or fear). This research adds to the scientific evidence that behavioral biases
exist and may influence investor decisions. It is time for the financial community to
accept the scientific evidence, and update the tools used to help investors determine their
true risk profile, accounting for any biases they may have.74
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University of Minnesota. 
The purpose of this research is to find out the influence that psychology and behavior 
have on an individual's investment decisions and whether certain behavioral traits can 
predict future investment decisions. 
The information obtained in this survey will be kept confidential and will be used for the 
sole purpose of this research. No identifiable information will be requested; all answers 
are anonymous.  
If you are 18+ years old and consent to participating in this research, please click "I 
Consent" to begin the survey. While we encourage you to answer each question 
completely, you are free to skip any questions or exit this survey at any time by closing 
the browser window. It is expected that the survey will take 5-10 minutes to complete. 
The important aspect is to answer truthfully so we can better understand how emotion 
and cognitive make up affect investment decisions. 
THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS. 
 
Purpose of Study - Consent
 
I Consent n m l k j
I Do Not Consent n m l k jThe first group of questions contains questions from a traditional risk profile questionnaire as well as a few behavioral finance questions to 
better understand how your mind makes decisions.
THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS 
 
 2. What is your current age?
 
 
Less than 25 years old n m l k j
25 to 35 years old n m l k j
36 to 45 years old n m l k j
46 to 55 years old n m l k j
56 to 65 years old n m l k j
66 to 75 years old n m l k j
Older than 75 years n m l k j3. When do you expect to start drawing income from your current investment portfolio?
 
 
Not for at least 20 years n m l k j
In 11 to 20 years n m l k j
In 5 to 10 years n m l k j
Not now but within 5 years n m l k j
Immediately n m l k j4. What is your ultimate goal for your investments?
 
 
To grow aggressively n m l k j
To grow significantly n m l k j
To grow moderately n m l k j
To grow with caution n m l k j




Generally keep pace with stock market n m l k j
Slightly trail stock market, but make a good profit n m l k j
Trail the stock market, but make a moderate profit n m l k j
Have some stability, but make modest profits n m l k j
Have a high degree of stability, but make small profits n m l k j6. Suppose the stock market performs unusually poorly over the next decade; what 
would you expect from your investments?
 
 
To lose money n m l k j
To make very little or nothing n m l k j
To eke out a little gain n m l k j
To make a modest gain n m l k j
To be little affected by what happens in the stock market n m l k j7. Which of these statements would best describe your attitude about the next three 
years' performance of your investments?
 
 
I don't mind if I lose money n m l k j
I can tolerate a loss n m l k j
I can tolerate a small loss n m l k j
I'd have a hard time tolerating any losses n m l k j
I need to see at least a small return n m l k j8. Which of these statements would best describe your attitude about the next three 
months' performance of your investments?
 
 
Who cares? One calendar quarter means nothing n m l k j
I wouldn't worry about losses in that time frame n m l k j
If I suffered a loss of greater than 10%, I'd get concerned n m l k j
I can only tolerate small short-term losses n m l k j
I'd have a hard time stomaching any losses n m l k j9. If you were faced with the following choice, which alternative would you choose?
 
 
A sure gain of $240 n m l k j
A 25% chance to gain $1,000 and a 75% chance to gain nothing n m l k j10. If you were faced with the following choice, which alternative would you choose?
 
 
A sure loss of $750 n m l k j
A 75% chance to lose $1,000 and a 25% chance to lose nothing n m l k j11. How often do you plan to monitor the performance of your investments?
 
 
More than monthly n m l k j
Every 1 - 3 months n m l k j
Semi-annually n m l k j
Annually n m l k j
Every 2 - 3 years n m l k j12. Fund ABC invests in stocks and has an annualized (yearly) return of 18% per year 
over the past 10 years. The fund remained invested in stocks during good and bad 
times. 
Investors in the fund can choose to invest or not invest in the fund at various times 
based upon the economic conditions and expected return.  




Between 15% and 30% n m l k j
Between 0% and 15% n m l k j
Better than 30% n m l k j
Worse than -1% n m l k j13. You have been considering making an investment in a health care company that has 
applied for approval for a drug with the FDA. Upon researching the company, you 
conclude that there is a 75% chance the drug gets approved and a 25% chance it is 
denied.
If the drug is approved, the stock will increase 20%, but if it is not approved the stock 
will lose 50%. Do you make the investment? 
75% chance you GAIN 20% 
25% chance you LOSE 50% 
 
 
No. I do not make the investment. n m l k j
Yes. I make the investment. n m l k j14. The earth is 93 million miles from the sun. Without looking it up, what do you believe 
the population of Australia was in 2009? 
 
 
Less than 30 million people n m l k j
31 - 60 million people n m l k j
61 - 90 million people n m l k j
Over 90 million people n m l k j15. You are going to add an investment to your current portfolio. Both investment A and 
B have the same expected return.
If you could only choose one of the investments, which one would it be? 
Investment A: 70% probability it GAINS 18%; 30% probability it LOSES 17%. 
Investment B: 30% probability it GAINS 25%; 70% probability it LOSES 0%. 
 
 
Investment B n m l k j
Investment A n m l k jThis final section contains 9 scenarios of various economic and stock market situations. 
Please answer questions based upon what you would actually do, not what you think is the right thing to do.  
THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS. 
 
 16. You reviewed your investment account and its performance two weeks ago. You 
were pleased with the performance and liked the diversified nature of the portfolio.
Since that time, the stock market has lost 15% in value; two major corporations have 
announced major layoffs and the Federal Reserve held an emergency meeting to 
discuss the financial state of the economy. You turn on the TV and find that the stock 
market is down another 4% today alone.  
Do you look at how your account has performed over the past two weeks? 
 
 
Yes. And if my account has performed equally poorly I would be aggressive and buy more stocks. n m l k j
Yes. And if my account has performed equally poorly I would be conservative and sell some stocks. n m l k j
Yes. I don't know if I would make any changes, but I would need to know how I am doing. n m l k j
Yes. Regardless of how my portfolio has performed, I would become more conservative. n m l k j
No. I just reviewed my portfolio and am not influenced by short-term market movements. n m l k j17. The stock market continues to lose money and many analysts are predicting an 
upcoming recession. You do some research and realize there is not much optimism for 
the state of the economy in the near future.
The stock market is now down 23% from recent highs. Upon reviewing your diversified 
portfolio, you notice that it is down 14% year to date. 
What would you do at this point? 
 
 
I would not do anything. n m l k j
I would probably sell all my investments to ensure no more future loss. n m l k j
I would probably become more conservative and sell some stocks. n m l k j
I would probably become more aggressive and buy more stocks. n m l k j18. Over the past five years stocks have gained an average of 8% per year. What do you 
believe the return for stocks will be next year?
 
 
Between -20% and -10%. n m l k j
Between +11% and +20% n m l k j
Between 0% and +10% n m l k j
Between -10% and 0%.  n m l k j19. A recent publication touted the great advancements of drugs to treat cancer and are 
almost certain to receive FDA approval this year. Biotechnology companies that make 
these drugs would benefit substantially from FDA approval.
After much research, you believe biotech stocks could double in value over the next 
year. 
You currently have a 5% exposure to biotech stocks in your account. But you realize 
that if you put half of your investments in biotech and it doubles (as you believe) that 
you will reach your retirement goal 5 years ahead of schedule. 
What would you do? 
 
 
Increase biotech to 50% of portfolio. Chance to retire 5 years early! n m l k j
Increase biotech to 25% of portfolio. Chance to retire 2.5 years early! n m l k j
Keep allocation the same. Not going to retire earlier than planned. n m l k j20. You have been very interested in the company ACME Supplies. You do some 
research on ACME and find they have had financial problems in the past two years, but 
sell a product that is widely used by major corporations, so there is demand for the 
products they supply.
There are not any analysts covering ACME at this time, but prior analyst coverage had 
ACME at a "Strong Buy". You notice that the stock price of ACME has come down a lot 
in the past two years. It is currently trading at $15 per share and it traded as high as $125 
per share two years ago. 
Based upon this information what do you think about the potential for the stock? 
 
 
Poor potential. Stock is at $15 for a reason. n m l k j
Good potential. It may not get back to $125, but will most likely move toward it. n m l k j
Excellent potential. This stock has a long way to go to get back to even. n m l k j21. Your current investment portfolio has 10 securities in it. Five of the securities have 
gained an average of 20% from when you bought them and the other five have lost an 
average of 7% since you purchased them.




No preference n m l k j
I would sell a security that has gone up in value n m l k j
I would sell a security that has gone down in value n m l k j22. You have been researching a company that makes applications for cell phones. After 
reading various analyst reports, you believe the company has great growth potential. 
The stock ended trading at $25 yesterday and you were going to buy it later today. But 
before the market opened, the company announced a record quarter with blowout 
earnings. The company said they expect revenues and profits to increase substantially 
into the foreseeable future. 
Before the stock market opens, the stock price goes up 30% and is now at $32.50 per 
share. Do you still buy the stock? 
 
 
Yes. It still can go up a lot. n m l k j
Not unless the stock came back down to $25 n m l k j23. You enter an Investment Simulation Game sponsored by XYZ News. The investment 
simulation will compare the performance of your portfolio to that of 99 others over a 3 
month period. 
All 100 participants will have the same tools, time and resources to make their 
investment decisions. The participants are quite diverse and vary in educational and 
professional backgrounds - just like the actual investment population. 
Upon completion of the game, how do you believe your portfolio performance will rank 
relative to others? 
 
 
My portfolio performance will rank in the top half of all portfolios n m l k j
My portfolio performance will rank in the bottom half of all portfolios n m l k j24. Continuing with the Investment Simulation Game...
How would your portfolio performance compare to a portfolio of randomly selected 
securities obtained by throwing darts? 
 
 
My portfolio will perform somewhat better. n m l k j
My portfolio will perform significantly better. n m l k j
Portfolios will have similar performance. n m l k j
The random portfolio will perform better. n m l k jPlease answer the following demographic questions. This information is important to see if there are any trends or outcomes unique to a 
specific investor subset.
26. Overall, how well did you understand the questions and the response choices in the 
survey?
27. What is your gender?
 
25. This survey is being performed by the Applied Economics 
Department at the University of Minnesota in conjunction with their 
privacy rules. How confident are you that the answers you provide 
will remain confidential and only be used for the specific purpose of 
this study?
Very Confident n m l k j
Somewhat Confident n m l k j
Not Confident n m l k j
I understood the survey completely n m l k j
I understood most of the survey n m l k j
I understood little of the survey n m l k j
I did not understand the survey n m l k j
Male n m l k j
Female n m l k j28. What is your ethnic background?
29. For how many years have you had investments other than bank accounts/CD?
30. Do you currently use a financial advisor/planner for any part of your investment 
portfolio?
African American n m l k j
Asian n m l k j
Caucasian/White n m l k j
Hispanic n m l k j
Pacific Islander n m l k j
Other n m l k j
None n m l k j
Less than two years n m l k j
Between 2 - 5 years n m l k j
Between 6 - 10 years n m l k j
More than 10 years
 
n m l k j
Yes, I use an advisor/planner n m l k j
No, I do not use an advisor/planner n m l k j
N/A, I have never invested before. n m l k j31. What is the highest level of education you have attained?
32. What is your current net worth? (Total Assets less Total Debt)
33. What is your current income? (household income if married)
 
High School/Some College n m l k j
4 Year College Degree n m l k j
Some Graduate School n m l k j
Graduate or Professional Degree n m l k j
Vocational School other than College
 
n m l k j
Less than $100,000 n m l k j
$100,000 - $250,000 n m l k j
$250,000 - $500,000 n m l k j
$500,000 - $1 Million n m l k j
Over $1 Million n m l k j
Less than $25,000 n m l k j
$25,000 - $75,000 n m l k j
$75,000 - $150,000 n m l k j
$150,000 - $250,000 n m l k j
More than $250,000 n m l k j
Decline to state n m l k jIn order to take this survey, you must consent to the terms. If you clicked the "I do not consent" button in error, please click on the 
"Prev" button to return to the start of the survey.
Thank you. 
 
 Thank you for taking the survey. If you have any questions or feedback, please email them to:
moor0762@umn.edu 
 Dependent Variable: GROWTH (Risk Profile Results) - Questions #2 - #8 from survey
GR
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 0.6561 0.2774 0.018 0.6131 0.2828 0.03
Male -0.2325 0.2178 0.2858 -0.2458 0.2187 0.261
Invexp 0.5032 0.2958 0.0889 0.4397 0.2907 0.13
Advisor -0.4183 0.2289 0.0676 -0.3712 0.2308 0.108
Col4 0.2445 0.2041 0.231 0.2704 0.2061 0.189
Age35 0.158 0.309 0.6091 0.2379 0.3098 0.443
Age45 -0.8647 0.2972 0.0036 -0.8897 0.3045 0.003
Age55 -1.399 0.2507 <.0001 -1.419 0.2502 0.000
Nw250 0.2282 0.2722 0.4017 0.2757 0.2696 0.307
Nw500 -0.0882 0.3046 0.7721 -0.1259 0.3044 0.679
Nw1000 0.2497 0.3076 0.4169 0.2219 0.3048 0.466
Nw1000p -0.0771 0.3284 0.8144 -0.084 0.3195 0.793
Dependent Variable: QUESTION LOSS AVERSION (1) - Questions #9 & #10 from survey
QLA1
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept -0.0306 0.2417 0.8993 -0.0467 0.2426 0.847
Male -0.0581 0.1845 0.753 -0.0763 0.1854 0.681
Invexp 0.1401 0.2411 0.5612 0.1495 0.2401 0.533
Advisor 0.0403 0.1842 0.8267 0.048 0.1828 0.793
Col4 0.0876 0.1769 0.6203 0.0924 0.1764 0.601
Age35 -0.206 0.2351 0.3808 -0.2129 0.2337 0.362
Age45 0.2787 0.2393 0.2442 0.2819 0.2411 0.242
Age55 0.1591 0.2212 0.4722 0.1498 0.2217 0.499
Nw250 -0.1157 0.2214 0.6012 -0.11753 0.2218 0.596
Nw500 -0.0953 0.2492 0.7021 -0.0827 0.2478 0.738
Nw1000 0.0433 0.2566 0.8659 0.0401 0.2561 0.876
Nw1000p 0.0395 0.2813 0.8882 0.0531 0.2838 0.852
Appendix 2
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit Equations
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit EquationsDependent Variable: QUESTION LOSS AVERSION (2) - Question #13 from survey
QLA2
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 0.4427 0.2541 0.0815 0.3886 0.2542 0.126
Male -0.0684 0.1945 0.7252 -0.0246 0.1974 0.901
Invexp -0.1206 0.253 0.6336 -0.1037 0.2524 0.681
Advisor 0.3144 0.1918 0.1011 0.3136 0.1899 0.099
Col4 0.0592 0.1875 0.7523 0.0914 0.1871 0.625
Age35 0.0696 0.2431 0.7746 0.1072 0.2421 0.658
Age45 0.2147 0.2509 0.3921 0.1926 0.2507 0.442
Age55 0.0906 0.2371 0.7024 0.1 0.2397 0.676
Nw250 -0.418 0.2318 0.0713 -0.4306 0.2307 0.062
Nw500 0.3728 0.2664 0.1618 0.3992 0.2662 0.134
Nw1000 -0.5666 0.2753 0.0396 -0.6206 0.2762 0.025
Nw1000p 0.2924 0.2922 0.317 0.3615 0.3011 0.23
Dependent Variable: QUESTION LOSS AVERSION (3) - Question #15 from survey
QLA3
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 1.0726 0.2814 0.0001 1.0175 0.2677 0
Male 0.345 0.21 0.1004 0.3292 0.2084 0.114
Invexp 0.1887 0.2705 0.4855 0.1387 0.2694 0.607
Advisor -0.2386 2074 0.2499 -0.2576 0.209 0.218
Col4 -0.1866 0.2028 0.3577 -0.1585 0.2026 0.434
Age35 -0.1227 0.2626 0.6402 -0.0948 0.2569 0.712
Age45 0.1747 0.2675 0.5137 0.2112 0.262 0.429
Age55 -0.0681 2508 0.7859 -0.1131 0.2512 0.653
Nw250 -0.3032 0.2507 0.2267 -0.2337 0.291 0.348
Nw500 0.0432 0.2739 0.8749 0.0585 0.2786 0.833
Nw1000 -0.3891 0.278 0.1616 -0.3969 0.2804 0.157
Nw1000p 0.519 0.3239 0.1091 0.5075 0.324 0.118
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit Equations
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit EquationsDependent Variable: QUESTION ANCHORING - Question #14 from survey
QAN
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 0.3848 0.2454 0.1169 0.3802 0.2434 0.118
Male 0.0106 186 0.9544 0.0085 0.1861 0.964
Invexp 0.0717 0.2448 0.7698 0.0788 0.2469 0.75
Advisor -0.0564 0.1862 0.7618 -0.0623 0.1862 0.738
Col4 -0.0405 0.1783 0.8203 -0.0383 0.1792 0.83
Age35 -0.4741 0.2384 0.0467 -0.4748 0.2408 0.049
Age45 -0.0861 0.2396 0.7192 -0.0738 0.241 0.759
Age55 0.4847 0.2223 0.0292 0.4804 0.2222 0.031
Nw250 0.1393 0.2244 0.5349 0.1369 0.225 0.543
Nw500 -0.2528 0.2517 0.3152 -0.2625 0.2522 0.298
Nw1000 0.0859 0.258 0.7392 0.0872 0.2587 0.736
Nw1000p -0.1728 0.2828 0.5411 -0.1685 0.2828 0.551
Dependent Variable: QUESTION OVERCONFIDENCE - Question #12 from survey
QOC
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 0.0333 0.2448 0.8919 0.03 0.244 0.902
Male -0.3393 0.1894 0.0732 -0.3443 0.1891 0.069
Invexp 0.0982 0.2453 0.689 0.1182 0.2453 0.63
Advisor -0.376 0.1883 0.0459 -0.3746 0.1888 0.047
Col4 -0.2144 0.1785 0.2297 -0.2162 0.1773 0.223
Age35 0.0457 0.2398 0.849 0.0124 0.2412 0.959
Age45 0.345 0.2439 0.1571 0.3567 0.2468 0.148
Age55 0.035 0.2246 0.8762 0.0111 0.2231 0.96
Nw250 -0.0698 0.2255 0.7568 -0.0574 0.2261 0.799
Nw500 0.1717 0.2538 0.4989 0.1518 0.2527 0.548
Nw1000 0.0244 0.2588 0.9248 0.0531 0.2592 0.838
Nw1000p -0.4531 0.2909 0.1193 -0.4497 0.2908 0.122
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit Equations
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit EquationsDependent Variable: QUESTION MYOPIA - Question #11 from survey
QMY
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept -0.413 0.2478 0.0956 -0.4319 0.2485 0.082
Male 0.2278 0.1976 0.2488 0.2429 0.1978 0.219
Invexp 0.0771 0.2439 0.752 0.6034 0.2425 0.794
Advisor 0.1368 0.1906 0.4729 0.1247 0.1925 0.517
Col4 0.3345 0.1847 0.0701 0.3318 0.1846 0.072
Age35 -0.1236 0.2406 0.6076 -0.1015 0.2387 0.671
Age45 -0.0043 0.2505 0.9864 -0.2605 0.2541 0.918
Age55 0.1498 0.2402 0.5349 0.1602 0.2371 0.499
Nw250 0.3102 0.2234 0.165 0.3119 0.2239 0.164
Nw500 -0.2403 0.2531 0.3423 -0.2172 0.2538 0.392
Nw1000 0.953 0.2876 0.0009 0.9445 0.2865 0.001
Nw1000p -0.52 0.3233 0.1078 -0.5218 0.3186 0.102
Dependent Variable: SIMULATED MYOPIA - Question #16 from survey
SMY
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 0.2085 0.2476 0.3996 0.2231 0.2485 0.369
Male 0.131 0.1873 0.4843 0.1527 0.1884 0.417
Invexp -0.1483 0.2451 0.454 -0.1398 0.2453 0.569
Advisor -0.3304 0.1887 0.08 -0.3524 0.899 0.064
Col4 0.3325 0.1807 0.0658 0.2992 0.1804 0.097
Age35 -0.6371 0.2422 0.0058 -0.6607 0.246 0.007
Age45 0.6367 0.2472 0.01 0.6598 0.249 0.008
Age55 -0.0782 0.2227 0.7255 -0.0973 0.2217 0.672
Nw250 -0.1542 0.2264 0.4958 -0.1453 0.2262 0.521
Nw500 -0.0848 0.2557 0.7401 -0.07726 0.2566 0.763
Nw1000 0.3852 0.2609 0.1399 0.3773 0.2594 0.146
Nw1000p -0.2524 0.2827 0.372 -0.2294 0.2851 0.421
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit Equations
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit EquationsDependent Variable: SIMULATED OVERCONFIDENCE (1) - Question #19 from survey
SOC1
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 1.0407 0.2697 0.0001 1.031 0.7869 0
Male -0.0924 0.1891 0.6251 -0.0872 0.19 0.646
Invexp -0.1852 0.2595 0.4753 -0.1842 0.257 0.474
Advisor 0.173 0.1943 0.3733 0.1847 0.1963 0.347
Col4 -0.4284 0.1904 0.0244 -0.41 0.1915 0.032
Age35 0.1711 0.2511 0.4956 0.1532 0.2496 0.539
Age45 -0.2247 0.2507 0.3701 -0.2271 0.2541 0.371
Age55 -0.5663 0.2267 0.0125 -0.5746 0.2272 0.011
Nw250 -0.1842 0.2364 0.4355 -0.1773 0.2339 0.448
Nw500 -0.1945 0.256 0.4475 -0.1811 0.256 0.479
Nw1000 -0.0002 0.2605 0.9993 -0.00124 0.2622 0.996
Nw1000p -0.0289 0.2854 0.9194 -0.0405 0.2854 0.887
Dependent Variable: SIMULATED OVERCONFIDENCE (2) - Question #23 from survey
SOC2
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept -0.3143 0.2481 0.2052 -0.3048 0.2455 0.214
Male 0.3212 0.1974 0.1038 0.3653 0.2026 0.071
Invexp 0.2809 0.247 0.2554 0.2644 0.2436 0.278
Advisor -0.1477 0.1936 0.4455 -0.1421 0.1948 0.466
Col4 0.3954 0.1852 0.0327 0.4297 0.1828 0.019
Age35 -0.0487 0.2431 0.8411 -0.0531 0.2425 0.827
Age45 -0.4407 0.2524 0.0808 -0.4503 0.2522 0.074
Age55 0.5473 0.2433 0.0245 0.5803 0.2445 0.018
Nw250 -0.0359 0.2238 0.8725 -0.0531 0.2251 0.811
Nw500 0.5745 0.2624 0.0285 0.5661 0.2622 0.031
Nw1000 -0.1657 0.2735 0.5448 -0.1855 0.2776 0.504
Nw1000p 0.6953 0.347 0.0451 0.8346 0.3612 0.021
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit Equations
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit EquationsDependent Variable: SIMULATED OVERCONFIDENCE (3) - Question #24 from survey
SOC3
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept -0.6404 0.2543 0.0118 -0.6261 0.2535 0.014
Male 0.5891 0.1951 0.0025 0.5901 0.1947 0.002
Invexp 0.6656 0.2515 0.0081 0.6902 0.2508 0.006
Advisor -0.0543 0.1903 0.7754 -0.0255 0.1884 0.892
Col4 0.2219 0.1863 0.234 0.1659 0.1876 0.377
Age35 -0.198 0.2423 0.4137 -0.2729 0.2437 0.263
Age45 0.0205 0.2452 0.9334 0.0189 0.2461 0.939
Age55 0.5327 0.2401 0.0265 0.4987 0.2378 0.036
Nw250 -0.0639 0.2274 0.7788 0.0027 0.2263 0.99
Nw500 0.0183 0.2587 0.9426 -0.0273 0.2598 0.916
Nw1000 0.00684 0.2694 0.9797 0.0628 0.2687 0.815
Nw1000p 0.2563 0.315 0.4159 0.2343 0.3093 0.449
Dependent Variable: SIMULATED ANCHORING (1) - Question #18 from survey
SAN1
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 0.825 0.2821 0.0034 0.7902 0.2938 0.007
Male -0.3573 0.2161 0.0983 -0.3599 0.2168 0.097
Invexp -0.0443 0.2847 0.8763 -0.0521 0.2769 0.851
Advisor -0.0718 0.2224 0.7469 -0.0982 0.2224 0.659
Col4 0.1735 0.2066 0.401 0.2192 0.2105 0.298
Age35 0.1043 0.2779 0.7073 0.1569 0.2761 0.57
Age45 0.1286 0.29 0.6573 0.1071 0.2915 0.713
Age55 0.0128 0.2628 0.9612 0.0758 0.2643 0.774
Nw250 0.1289 0.2644 0.6259 0.169 0.2701 0.531
Nw500 -0.0832 0.2976 0.7799 -0.1795 0.3037 0.554
Nw1000 0.1252 0.3076 0.6839 0.1989 0.3077 0.518
Nw1000p -0.0458 0.3339 0.8908 -0.1258 0.3335 0.449
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit Equations
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit EquationsDependent Variable: SIMULATED ANCHORING (2) - Question #20 from survey
SAN2
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept 0.6045 0.2549 0.0177 0.5843 0.2549 0.022
Male -0.1338 0.1869 0.4741 -0.1314 0.1878 0.484
Invexp 0.2538 0.2524 0.3147 0.2587 0.2532 0.307
Advisor -0.0867 0.1913 0.6503 -0.0789 0.1891 0.676
Col4 0.1186 0.1821 0.515 0.1176 0.1828 0.52
Age35 -0.0446 0.2453 0.8558 -0.0592 0.2441 0.808
Age45 0.0868 0.2464 0.7248 0.1251 0.2482 0.614
Age55 -0.0926 0.2235 0.6788 -0.1164 0.224 0.604
Nw250 -0.5668 0.2347 0.0158 -0.5375 0.234 0.022
Nw500 -0.2726 0.2503 0.2761 -0.3095 0.2513 0.218
Nw1000 0.0539 0.2565 0.8335 0.0693 0.2572 0.788
Nw1000p -0.059 0.2802 0.8332 -0.0708 0.2818 0.802
Dependent Variable: SIMULATED ANCHORING (3) - Question #22 from survey
SAN3
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept -0.8316 0.2618 0.0015 -0.8744 0.2701 0.001
Male 0.1761 0.1903 0.3546 0.1515 0.1881 0.42
Invexp 0.0946 0.2543 0.7098 0.1361 0.2557 0.594
Advisor 0.1861 ..1927 0.3341 0.2163 0.1931 0.262
Col4 0.3466 0.1883 0.0657 0.3597 0.1877 0.055
Age35 -0.4968 0.2493 0.0462 -0.5442 0.2498 0.029
Age45 0.0649 0.252 0.7967 0.1161 0.255 0.649
Age55 -0.079 0.228 0.7289 -0.0848 0.2243 0.705
Nw250 0.2717 0.2356 0.2489 0.2621 0.2379 0.271
Nw500 0.3954 0.256 0.1224 0.4134 0.2574 0.108
Nw1000 -0.3657 0.2629 0.1642 -0.3979 0.2615 0.128
Nw1000p 0.2855 0.2844 0.3153 0.3267 0.2847 0.251
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit Equations
Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit EquationsDependent Variable: SIMULATED LOSS AVERSION (1) - Question #17 from survey
SLA1
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept -0.6969 0.2636 0.0082 -0.6331 0.2572 0.014
Male -0.1624 0.2009 0.4188 -0.1688 0.2015 0.402
Invexp -0.7657 0.2624 0.0035 -0.7584 0.2594 0.003
Advisor 0.1478 0.2026 0.4658 0.1342 0.2042 0.511
Col4 0.3794 0.1982 0.0556 0.3404 0.1965 0.083
Age35 0.0789 0.2626 0.7637 0.119 0.2613 0.649
Age45 0.0973 0.2642 0.7128 0.0292 0.2701 0.914
Age55 0.2486 0.2378 0.2957 0.2286 0.2383 0.337
Nw250 0.224 0.2469 0.3643 0.1528 0.2496 0.54
Nw500 0.1198 0.2667 0.6533 0.1709 0.2675 0.523
Nw1000 0.0958 0.269 0.7217 0.097 0.2656 0.715
Nw1000p -0.2759 0.3034 0.3632 -0.2692 0.3044 0.413
Dependent Variable: SIMULATED LOSS AVERSION (2) - Question #21 from survey
SLA2
Parameter Estimate Error P>ChiSq Estimate Error P>z
Intercept -0.7035 0.2613 0.0071 -0.6771 0.2538 0.008
Male 0.2821 0.1903 0.1383 0.2711 0.1903 0.154
Invexp 0.4096 0.2602 0.1154 0.3969 0.2651 0.134
Advisor -0.1566 0.1944 0.4204 -0.1848 0.1955 0.345
Col4 0.1889 0.187 0.3126 0.1764 0.1847 0.34
Age35 -0.5465 0.2543 0.0317 -0.569 0.2606 0.029
Age45 0.2976 0.2571 0.247 0.3459 0.2621 0.187
Age55 0.4225 0.2261 0.0616 0.4192 0.2268 0.065
Nw250 -0.0396 0.2352 0.8664 -0.0326 0.2369 0.89
Nw500 0.1117 0.2604 0.6678 0.0927 0.2626 0.724
Nw1000 -0.0333 0.2623 0.8989 -0.0074 0.2609 0.977
Nw1000p -0.3478 0.2921 0.2338 -0.3541 0.2921 0.225
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Individual Probit Equations Multivariate Probit Equations